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TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNANCE
PRINCIPLES FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF SOCIAL
PROTECTION BENEFITS: COMPARATIVE LESSONS
FROM DUTCH AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCES
Frans Pennings* and Paul M. Secunda**
The purpose of this article is to introduce a new approach to social
protection benefit provision through an analysis and comparison of two
of the advanced benefit systems in the world. Both the Dutch and
American examples teach us that meaningful social benefit protection is
possible, consistent, and necessary within market-based societies.
Our recommendation is that advanced-market societies start a
discussion on social protection benefits based on the dual principles of
federalism/subsidiarity and fiduciary duty. Federalism provides that
the national/federal government should provide the principles and
minimal framework for benefit provision, while regional authorities,
employers, and insurance companies should be given freedom, and the
duty, to implement the underlying schemes to meet the challenges of the
local situation. However, to constrain the sometime self-interested and
conflicted motives of employers and insurance companies in the benefits
system, we also suggest that countries adopt, at the national level,
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to protect against abuse,
discrimination, and arbitrary action in the provision of such benefits. In
addition, these principles should also be applied to employer-sponsored
schemes in both countries, to the extent that such duties do not already
exist.
We hope, and believe, that through the construction of such a social
benefit system, countries can guarantee a minimal level of benefit
protection that will help their citizens negotiate difficult times during
retirement, disability, sickness and injury, and unemployment. In turn,
the "benefit" of such a system will be the recognition of the dignity and
self-worth of all individuals, which is a non-ideological goal that we can
all embrace.
* Professor of Labour Law and Social Security Law, Utrecht University, Netherlands
and guest professor at Gothenburg University, Sweden.
** Professor of Law, and Director, Labor and Employment Law Program, Marquette
University Law School. We are grateful to Zachary Mesenbourg for his exceptional
research, writing, and editorial assistance on this article.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Social protection benefits include retirement, disability,
unemployment, sickness, and healthcare benefits. In Western
Europe and the United States, these benefits have developed
both symmetrically and asymmetrically. Some historical factors
that influenced the systems were basically the same: the
Industrial Revolution led to a demand for dependent workers;
because of their dependency, protective measures had to be
taken, otherwise mass poverty threatened.1 Another important
development was the crisis of the 1930s that led in the next
decade to the conviction that society should be free from want
and poverty.2 This idea was first realized in the United States,
with the federal Social Security Act,3 but was also adopted in
Europe where, during the Second World War, blueprints were
adopted for a better society after war.4
There are also important differences. In the Netherlands,
as a result of the involvement of Christian Parties in the
government and Parliament, there is a general principle that
ensuring a sufficient income for living is a public concern,5
whereas in the United States, the focus has been much more on
individual responsibility.6 This difference in approach to social
protection systems can still be clearly seen today. At first
glance, a comparison of one European and the American system
would therefore not appear to be very fruitful, but an initial
analysis that the authors completed during a conference three
years ago at Gothenburg University in Sweden persuaded them
to undertake an in-depth comparison.
In short, Western European and American social protection
1. Abe Bortz, Historical Development of the Social Security Act, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN. (Sept. 21, 2014), http://www.ssa.gov/history/bortz.html; David N. Jones,
International Social Work and Social Welfare: Europe, ENCYC. OF SOC. WORK (June
2013),
http://socialwork.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199975839.001.0001/acrefo
re-9780199975839-e-568?rskey=EaHAmf&result=1.
2. Bortz, supra note 1.
3. Arthur J. Altmeyer, Social Welfare in The United States, SOC. SEC. HISTORY,
www.ssa.gov/history/aja964.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2015).
4. Id.
5. National
Reform
Programme:
The
Netherlands
2013,
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/nrp2013_netherlands_en.pdf.
6. What
is
Social
Security?
NAT’L
ACAD.
OF
SOC.
INS.,
www.nasi.org/book/export/html/159 (last visited Apr. 21, 2015).
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benefit systems have important elements in common: (1) the
risks against which they seek to provide protection, (2) the
benefits provided by the system, and (3) the principles
supporting these social protection programs. Similarly, these
systems have many challenges in common, specifically the
increasing greying of their populations and the need to ensure
adequate
access
to
minimum
retirement,
disability,
unemployment, sickness, and healthcare income. There has
been a move to include more private actors in the social
insurance systems in both Western Europe and the United
States, with mixed success being experienced for different
reasons.7 As a result, the authors believe a more in-depth
analysis comparing these different systems would be fruitful in
aiding an understanding of the development of these programs,
as well as providing important lessons about one another’s social
protection benefit experiences.
In this comparison, the authors will primarily deal with a
major question for organizing social protection by law: Who is
responsible for the provision of benefits? This approach enables
us to compare different systems because it leaves open whether
and how a particular risk should be protected. The answers to
this question then allow us to compare how these issues are
addressed in Western Europe, specifically in the Netherlands, in
contrast to the United States.
We will investigate major parts of the Dutch system with
those of the United States, focusing on provisions made for
protection of retirement, disability, unemployment, sickness,
and healthcare benefits. We conclude that some programs are
better provided at the national level, while other programs are
more suited for local or regional treatment. Additionally, we
conclude that some social protection programs are better
provided by public bodies alone, while other programs can
benefit through various forms of private actor participation.
Finally, we embrace the ideas of federalism and subsidiarity on
the one hand, and fiduciary duty on the other.
Federalism provides that the national government should
provide the principles and minimal framework for benefit

7. See generally FRANS PENNINGS, THOMAS ERHAG & SARA STENDAHL (EDS.),
NON-PUBLIC ACTORS IN SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, A COMPARATIVE STUDY
(Kluwer Law International, 2013) (discussing in a series of countries, including the
United States, whether non-public actors have a role to play in the administration of
social protection benefits).
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provisions,8 while principles of subsidiarity provide that regional
authorities, employers, and insurance companies should be given
freedom, and the duty, to implement the underlying schemes to
meet the challenges of the local situation.9
However, to
constrain the sometimes self-interested and conflicted motives of
employers and insurance companies in the benefits systems in
both countries, we suggest that countries adopt, at the national
level, fiduciary duties of loyalty and care for benefit
administrators to protect against abuse, discrimination, and
arbitrary action in the provision of social protection benefits.
This paper is divided into six Parts. Part II discusses the
social protection benefit system in the United States. Part III
undertakes a similar analysis of the Dutch system. Part IV then
draws out some important similarities and differences between
the two systems. Part V considers different dimensions through
which it is possible to find unifying themes between the Dutch
and American social protection systems. Part VI concludes by
proposing that retirement, disability, unemployment, sickness,
and healthcare benefits be provided based on principles of
federalism and subsidiarity and fiduciary duty, or through
national governments with local assistance from regional
authorities, employers and insurance companies. On the other
hand, to combat self-interested motives of private actors, we
recommend that national fiduciary standards of loyalty and care
be implemented to make benefit provision more consistent with
individual self-worth and dignity.
II.

SOCIAL PROTECTION BENEFIT SYSTEM IN THE
UNITED STATES

Social protection benefits in the United States evolved over
time and were shaped by important historical factors.
Throughout the colonial period, support for those in need
revolved around the concept of community responsibility (where
the poor relied on the community itself to help them through
difficult times, rather than public institutions).10 By the mid1800s, Americans started requesting a form of public welfare;
8.
9.

Altmeyer, supra note 3.
David A. Bosnich, The Principle of Subsidiarity, ACTON INST. FOR THE
STUDY OF RELIGION AND LIBERTY, http://www.acton.org/pub/religion-liberty/volume6-number-4/principle-subsidiarity (last visited Apr. 21, 2015).
10. Bortz, supra note 1. This system worked fairly well at the time given that
territories were not expansive and communities were tight knit, making it easy for
people to support each other. Id.
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the response came in the form of “custodial institutions” for the
poor, insane, criminals, etc.11
The Industrial Revolution became the most formative and
influential factor in the development of modern social protection
benefits in the United States.12 The Industrial Revolution led to
income dependence: People now had real responsibilities to both
procure and maintain jobs, or face the consequences of not being
able to provide enough for their families.13 As the number of
Americans (or workers) unable to support their families
increased, backing for a true public welfare system grew, and
the concept of a bureau for public welfare emerged.14 Public
opinion shifted, there was more “recognition that poverty was
often attributable to social inequities rather than personal
defects.”15 All of these shifts helped shape the structure of the
current American system.
In the United States, the basic social protection programs
are run predominantly by the federal (national) government,16
with some important exceptions for each type of social protection
program where states and private actors also play a role.17 On
the other hand, government actors, as opposed to private actors,
play the predominant role in the administration and
implementation of these programs.18
11.

Id.
It appears that the post-Revolutionary War generations were far
more prepared than their predecessors to assign a larger share of
responsibility for dependent behavior to the structure of society
itself rather than to individual idiosyncrasy, choosing to locate in
existing social arrangements the essential causes of the problem.
As they viewed it, American society was so open and
unstructured—filled with limitless opportunities for achievement
and vice—and its members so inadequately prepared to cope with
it—since neither church nor school, nor, above all else, family
provided the necessary discipline—that poverty, crime and
insanity threatened the welfare of the new republic. Id.
12. See id. (examining triggers during the revolution that helped shaped social
security policy, such as cities growing too fast with millions living in poverty,
exploitation of minorities, and rampant unemployment).
13. Id.
14. See id. The idea for such a bureau started in Kansas City in 1910.
15. Id.; but see generally Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model
of Retirement Plans Today: Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 59 (2000); Edward Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451,
471 (2004) (discussing individual responsibility model in employee benefit law
context).
16. Altmeyer, supra note 3.
17. Id.
18. Organizational Structure of the Social Security Administration, SOC. SEC.
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As an initial matter, it is important to point out that the
term “Social Security” in the United States refers to the
government-run insurance program for older and disabled
Americans.19 The term was first used when Congress passed the
federal Social Security Act in 1935.20 Shortly after World War
II, it became popular in Europe, introduced by the Beveridge
Report that had the term “social security” in its title.21 This
means—maybe somewhat remarkably—that Europe inherited
the term from the United States. Still, it has an entirely
different meaning in the United States than in Europe (where it
generally refers to all schemes covering social risks).22 In the
United States, pension and disability benefits are defined by
federal Social Security statutory law, while all states have their
own public sector pension statutes and a few states have stateprovided disability plans.23
In addition to Social Security, a large segment of the
American populace receives employer-provided retirement and
welfare benefits either under collective bargaining agreements
or, more likely, through the unilateral and voluntary actions of
employers (spurred on by vast tax subsidies for sponsoring such
benefit plans).24 The federal Employee Retirement Income

ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/org/orgdco.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2015).
19. See History FAQs, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/history/hfaq.html
(last visited April 21, 2015) (“The Social Security Act was signed by FDR on 8/14/35.
Taxes were collected for the first time in January 1937 and the first onetime, lumpsum payments were made that same month. Regular ongoing monthly benefits
started in January 1940.”).
20. See NEVILLE HARRIS, SOCIAL SECURITY IN CONTEXT 14 (Oxford University
Press, Inc. 2000) (“This term indicated a broad view of the objective of state support:
from one which was conditional on insurance, and thereby restricted to workers, to a
system of social protection for all in poverty and need.”).
21. See generally WILLIAM BEVERIDGE, SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ALLIED
SERVICES, BEVERIDGE REPORT, (H.M. Stationery Office 1942), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/19_07_05_beveridge.pdf
(providing
a
blueprint for post-war social protection system in Europe).
22. See generally infra Part III (on the Dutch Social Protection Benefit System
in the Netherlands).
23. See, e.g., ST. OF CAL. EMP. DEV. DEP’T, http://www.edd.ca.gov/disability/ (last
visited Apr. 21, 2015) (providing an overview of California’s state-provided disability
plan, which acts as a partial wage-replacement insurance plan).
24. See Dustin Mineau, The 401k is a Government Subsidy for Wall Street,
DAILY
KOS
(Sept.
27,
2012,
1:32
PM),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/09/17/1132891/The-401k-is-a-GovernmentSubsidy-for-Wall-Street#. Employers get tax deductions and or credits for the
creation of a 401k plan, as well as additional benefits for matching an employee’s
contributions. Id.
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Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)25 provides rules for the provision of
such benefits, including rules for the protection of certain forms
of pension funds from forfeiture.26
The American Social Security system is funded on a pay-asyou-go (PAYG) basis and takes the form of a defined benefit
plan.27 After employers and employees pay into the program,
during the employee’s working life, the employee begins to
receive a defined retirement benefit after she reaches a
designated retirement age (which can vary based on the
individual’s wishes as to when she or he wishes to start receiving
benefits).28 This program in its current form, after some futile
attempts to introduce privatization, remains bereft of private
actors, and is run completely by the Social Security
Administration, which is an independent federal agency.29
The rest of this Part considers the four major American
social insurance schemes: (1) the old-age, survivor, and disability
insurance program under Social Security; (2) the unemployment
compensation system; (3) the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA)30 for sickness and family leave; and (4) with regard to
healthcare, both the public Medicare and Medicaid health
insurance systems, as well as the private health insurance
25. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2012).
26. See Health Plans & Benefits: Employee Retirement Income Security Act –
ERISA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/health-plans/erisa.htm
(last visited Apr. 21, 2015) (explaining plan requirements that all participants must
abide by).
27. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., supra note 6 (describing how today’s current
workers pay into the system with money flowing back out to current beneficiaries
knowing they will receive a similar benefit once they reach retirement age).
28. See Retirement Planner: Benefits By Year Of Birth, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/retire2/agereduction.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2015). A
person can start receiving Social Security Benefits as early as 62 or as late as 70. Id.
But if someone chooses to start receiving payments early, the benefit is reduced
fractions of a percent for each mother before full retirement age. Id.
29. See Kathleen Schlach, Bush Eyes Privatizing Social Security in Second
Term,
NPR
(Nov.
11,
2004,
12:00
AM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4164384
(stacking
up
President George W. Bush’s three proposed social security reform models, all of
which failed to gain any traction); see also James K. Glassman, Moynihan’s Social
Security Plan, WASH. POST A19 (Mar. 24, 1998), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/special/security/stories/oss040898.htm (outlining Sen. Daniel Patrick
Moynihan’s (D-N.Y.) proposal to change Social Security by cutting the payroll tax so
that Americans could use the money for their own private retirement accounts);
Social
Security
in
the
United
States,
INFOPLEASE.COM,
http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopedia/society/social-security-in-united-states.html.
(last visited Apr. 21, 2015).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012).

PENNINGS (DO NOT DELETE)

322

10/1/15 10:30 AM

BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16.2

system under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Part A. discusses
pensions and disability insurance under the federal Social
Security program. More specifically, this section considers why
privatization has been unsuccessful, even though such
participation might lead to more choice, more efficiency, and
more activation. “Activation” is a term generally absent from
social insurance discussions in the United States. The term is
used here to refer to activation strategies that seek to activate
large groups of inactive persons in the labor market, such as
recipients
of
unemployment
or
disability
benefits.31
Privatization, and the greater use of private actors in the social
insurance context, tends to go hand-in-hand with redirecting
resources toward activation strategies.32
Part B. next explores the federal-state unemployment
compensation program and highlights the few places where nonpublic actors have played a role in this program, primarily in the
job search context. Additionally, this Part considers why it is
unlikely that unions and employer organizations will play a
greater role in the future development of this program, similar
to the European Ghent System of unemployment insurance.
Part C. discusses the largely inadequate American version
of sickness benefits. Unlike many other countries, the United
States does not have a national social insurance scheme that
provides for sickness benefits. Instead, under the federal Family
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), qualified employees are entitled
to twelve weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave for designated
reasons.33 In addition to the federal FMLA, as discussed in more
detail below, many states and municipalities have their own
equivalent laws and various types of sickness benefits.
Finally, Part D. is divided into two subparts. The first
subpart discusses the public health insurance programs,
Medicare (for the elderly and disabled) and Medicaid (for the
poor, needy or disabled). The second subpart recognizes that
without a true national healthcare system, those not covered by
Medicare or Medicaid must find health insurance coverage
either through their employer or on their own through the

31. See Werner Eichhorst & Regina Konle-Seidl, The Interaction of Labor
Market Regulation and Labor Market Policies in Welfare State Reform, 28 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 1, 27 (2006).
32. See Robert H. Cox, From Safety Net to Trampoline: Labor Market Activation
in the Netherlands and Denmark, 11 GOVERNANCE: INTL.J. POLICY & ADMIN. 397,
397 (1998).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 2612.
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private market. Consequently, health insurance remains largely
an employer-dominated area in the United States, and the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) plays a large role in the provisions of
healthcare for an increasing number of Americans. So, the
second subpart discusses the provision of private health
insurance through employer-sponsored plans under ACA and
ERISA.
A. OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS
In the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
program (OASDI), the federal system organizes retirement
security for elderly and disabled persons, as well as for survivors
of elderly couples.34 The Social Security Act was signed into law
by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1935 as part of his
New Deal Program.35 It now covers some 58 million Americans,
with one out of every four American families receiving benefits,
and for people aged sixty-five and older, it is the main source of
income.36
In addition to the elderly, through the social
supplemental insurance (SSI) program, more children receive
benefits under Social Security than any other federal program.37
It is also the most efficient social insurance program, costing less
than one penny in administrative expenses for every dollar that
it metes out.38 Because of its hallowed status after almost eighty
34. See EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits, Ch. 1: Employee Benefits in the
United States: An Introduction, Employee Benefit Research Institute (March 2001).
Additionally, a separate Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program provides
monthly cash benefits to certain low-income elderly, disabled or blind Americans
[hereinafter EBRI databook].
35. Eduard A. Lopez, Constitutional Background to the Social Security Act of
1935,
50
SOC.
SEC.
BULLETIN
5,
6
(Jan.
1987),
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v50n1/v50n1p5.pdf.
36. See Elisa A. Walker, Virginia P. Reno & Thomas N. Bethell, Social Security
Finances: Findings of the 2014 Trustees Report, NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC. INS. NO. 44, 2
(July
2014),
available
at
http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/SS_Brief_044.pdf.
37. See EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits, supra note 34. “In the study, 84%
of American’s agreed with the following statement: ‘I don’t mind paying for Social
Security taxes because it provides security and stability to millions of retired
Americans, disabled individuals, and the children and widowed spouses of deceased
workers.’” Nat’s Acad. Of Soc. Ins., Video: Social Security: Americans Agree, NASI
(http://www.nasi.org/learn/social-security/americansagree?) (last visited Apr. 21,
2015).
38. Id. “Social Security is efficient. Less than a penny of every one dollar is
spent on administration, the rest is for the 55 million people who get benefits every
month.”
Social
Security:
Americans
Agree,
NASI
(Aug.
10,
2012),
http://www.nasi.org/learn/social-security/americansagree?; see also Social Security:
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years in existence, it is considered to be politically untouchable
and the “third rail” of politics in the United States.39
Social Security provides an income base, in the form of a
lifetime annuity, to nearly all retired and disabled workers and
their surviving spouses.40 It was not until 1956, twenty years
after the Social Security Act was initially enacted, that the
Disability Insurance program was added to the Social Security
program, providing income to disabled workers.41
OASDI benefits are defined by federal statutory law.42
Throughout its history, it has been consistently administered
exclusively by public authorities, with a complete absence of any
role for private actors.43 The program is a pay-as-you-go system
(PAYG), meaning today’s workers pay (through payroll taxes
matched in amount by their employers) for the benefits of
today’s retirees.44 Social Security covers more than 95% of
Americans, provides half of all retirement benefits, and
currently, one in seven, or 58 million Americans, receive such
benefits.45 Under the OASDI program, benefits are adjusted for
Americans Agree, NASI (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.nasi.org/learn/socialsecurity/americansagree?.
39. “It was former U.S. House Speaker Thomas ‘Tip’ O’Neill who first called
Social Security the ‘third rail of American politics,’ and O’Neill did as much as
anyone to make Social Security a deadly political issue.” See Why Is Social Security
Called
the
Third
Rail
of
American
Politics?
SENIOR
LIVING,
http://seniorliving.about.com/od/socialsecurity101/a/socialsecurity.htm (last visited
Apr. 21, 2015).
40. Jonathan Barry Forman, Reforming Social Security to Encourage the
Elderly to Work, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 289, 291–92 (1998).
41. See John R. Kearney, Social Security and the “D” in OASDI: The History of a
Federal Program Insuring Earners Against Disability, SOC. SEC. BULLETIN Vol. 66
No.
3,
2,
9-11
(2005/2006),
available
at
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v66n3/v66n3p1.pdf (discussing the eventual
addition of disability coverage along with operational considerations for its
enactment and continued existence).
42. The original Social Security Act was enacted 14 Aug. 1935. The Social
Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620. Private occupational pension
plans, a relatively new phenomenon in the United States, are generally governed by
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 10011461 (2012).
43. Kathryn L. Moore, Privatization of Social Security: Misguided Reform, 71
TEMP. L. REV. 131, 136 (1998).
44. See OASDI and SSI Programs Rates & Limits, 2014, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/prog_highlights/RatesLimits2014.html (last
visited Apr. 22, 2015). Most people pay 6.2%, while self-employed persons pay 12.4%.
Id.
45. See DAVID A. PRATT & SHARON REECE, ERISA AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW:
THE ESSENTIALS 5, 7 (American Bar Association Publishing 2010); see Elisa A.
Walker, Virginia P. Reno & Thomas N. Bethell, Social Security Finances: Findings of
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inflation and support the beneficiary’s spouse during the
beneficiary’s life, as well as after the beneficiary’s death.46
There is some debate about whether Social Security is in
financial trouble and in need of reform.47 On the one hand, the
financial distress of the system stems, in part, from a smaller
generation of workers seeking to support a larger generation of
workers (i.e., the baby boomers).48 Indeed, as a result of
increased life expectancies, there has been “a decrease in the
ratio of [old age and survivor insurance] OASI-covered workers
to OASI beneficiaries from 16.5 in 1950 to 3.7 in 1970 to 3.2 in
2008.”49 At some point, there will be more beneficiaries than
workers, and the PAYG system will falter. In the meantime, in
attempt to keep this scenario from coming to fruition, the
retirement age for full social security benefits has been raised to
sixty-seven for those born after 1960,50 and payroll taxes have
been raised to help keep the system solvent.51 Although not
exactly optimistic about the future of the Social Security System,
the 2014 report by the Trustees of the Social Security System
does point out that the system is not in short-term danger of
failing, but some immediate legislative action could forestall
further difficulties.52 The Disability Trust fund faces the largest
the 2014 Trustees Report, NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC. INS. NO. 44, 2 (July 2014), available at
http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/SS_Brief_044.pdf.
46. Forman, supra note 40, at 291.
47. See Status of the Social Security and Medicare Programs, a Summary of the
2012
Annual
Reports,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRSUM/index.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2015) (“[T]he
long-run actuarial deficits of the Social Security and Medicare programs worsened in
2012. The actuarial deficit in Social Security increased largely because of the
incorporation of updated economic data and assumptions.”).
48. See Amanda Alix, Are Baby Boomers Going to Drain Social Security Dry?
THE
MOTLEY
FOOL
(May
11,
2014),
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/05/11/are-baby-boomers-going-to-drainsocial-security-dr.aspx. The article states that the Social Security system depends on
the "old-age dependency ratio”—the ratio of people sixty-five and older to those ages
twenty to sixty-four. Id. In 2012, that ratio was 22.8%, but by 2050 that number is
expected to rise to 38.4%. Id.
49. EBRI Databook, supra note 34.
50. Id.
51. See Moore, supra note 43, at 136, 145 (describing how the Social Security
system is funded by payroll taxes that are imposed on both employees and
employers, and how benefits cannot increase unless payroll taxes are increased,
which may be unacceptable to many Americans).
52. Social Security and Medicare Board of Trustees, The Status of Social
Security and Medicare Programs: A Summary of the 2014 Annual Reports 5, SOC.
SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2015) (“While the
theoretical combined OASDI Trust Fund fails the long range test of close actuarial
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challenges, with its beneficiaries facing benefit cuts starting in
2016 if Congress does not take immediate action.53
Social security alone does not provide adequate retirement
income, evidenced by the fact that a large majority of U.S.
workers will see about a 40%–50% income replacement ratio
from Social Security.54 Most experts believe that at least a 70%
income replacement ratio is required to have adequate
retirement income.55 As discussed below employer-provided
pension and retirement plans have become so important in the
United States as a result of the current state of Social Security
benefits and the lack of personal savings.
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is one system through
which eligible people receive retirement income, but it is strictly
based on need.56 In general, a person can qualify for SSI
benefits if he or she meets the following requirements: (1) is at
least sixty-five years old, (2) is blind or disabled, (3) has limited
income and resources, and (4) is either a U.S. Citizen or national
or eligible alien.57 For 2014, those eligible individuals who fit
the criteria can receive $721 per month ($1,082 for an eligible
person with an eligible spouse).58 The purpose of SSI payments
balance, it does satisfy the test for short-range (10-year) financial adequacy. The
Trustees project that the combined trust fund asset reserves at the beginning of each
year will exceed that year’s projected cost through 2027.”).
53. Id. at 3-4 (“Social Security’s Disability Insurance (DI) program satisfies
neither the Trustees’ long-range test of close actuarial balance nor their short-range
test of financial adequacy and faces the most immediate financing shortfall of any of
the separate trust funds.”).
54. See Aon Consulting, Replacement Ratio Summary: A Measurement Tool for
Retirement Planning 2, AON.COM (2008), http://www.aon.com/about-aon/intellectualcapital/attachments/human-capital-consulting/RRStudy070308.pdf
(chart
illustrating that a person retiring with income of $60,000 can expect a replacement
ratio of 46%). An income replacement ration “is a person’s gross income after
retirement, divided by his or her gross income before retirement.” Id.
55. See Jack VanDerhei, Can Social Security and 401(k) Savings Be “Enough”?,
EMP.
BENEFIT
RES.
INST.
(Jan.
22,
2014),
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/PR1058.RetAdqcy.22Jan14.pdf (reiterating that 70% of
replacement income is the typical standard for what is believed to be a financially
successful retirement).
56. See Beth Laurence, What Is The Difference Between Social Security
Disability
(SSDI)
and
SSI?,
DISABILITYSECRETS.COM,
http://www.disabilitysecrets.com/page5-13.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2015) (funding
for SSI is through a "means-tested program," which has nothing to do with work
history, it is all based on financial need).
57. See Understanding Supplemental Security Income SSI Eligibility
Requirements – 2014 Edition, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/ssi/texteligibility-ussi.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
58. See SSI Federal Payment Amounts for 2014, Annual Report of the
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are to help people pay for necessities—food, clothes and housing.
Many disabled individuals who get SSI will also be eligible to get
Medicaid from the state in which they live.59 But because SSI is
a federal benefit with specific requirements, the government can
be as stringent as it would like in enforcing who receives it. This
has even led some to question its effectiveness and whether it
actually helps to perpetuate people living near the poverty line.60
In addition to the federal SSI payments, forty-six states
offer supplementary state SSI payments.61 As the supplemental
programs are state-run, each state can decide on its own how
much of a benefit to offer. As of 2013, Wisconsin, for example,
would pay up to $83.78 per month to an eligible individual
($132.05 per eligible couple).62 Critics attack state SSI claiming
states have an incentive to get a “welfare-receiving family [i.e.
receiving public assistance] with a disabled child, onto the SSI
rolls.”63

Supplemental
Security
Income
Program,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/SSI.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
59. See Laurence, supra note 56 (saying many of those on SSI also likely be
qualified to receive food stamps).
60. See Julie Turkewitz & Juliet Linderman, The Disability Trap, N.Y. TIMES,
SR5 (Oct. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/21/sunday-review/the-trap-ofsupplemental-security-income.html (recounting the story of Brad Crelia, and how
SSI is supposed to be his “safety net,” but “is actually the source of the problem,
experts say. S.S.I. traps many disabled people by limiting their income to levels just
above the poverty line, and taking away their cash benefits if they achieve any level
of security.”). Crelia commented, “I’ve been kept financially sort of in this cage. Just
basic things that people rely upon, having a normal life, aren’t things that are really
accessible. And won’t be.” Id.
61. See Laurence, supra note 56 (listing Arizona, North Dakota, West Virginia,
and Mississippi as the four states who do not offer supplemental SSI); SSI State
Supplementary Payments/Optional State Supplements and Eldercare, PAYING FOR
SENIOR
CARE,
http://www.payingforseniorcare.com/longtermcare/resources/ssi_state_ssp_oss.html,
(last updated Jan. 2014).
62. See Benefits of Supplemental Security Income (SSI), WIS. DEP’T OF HEALTH
SERVS, http://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/ssi/benefits.htm (last revised Mar. 27, 2014)
(qualifying the specifics for Wisconsin SSI eligibility, including how it operates, who
qualifies and payment levels).
63. See Patricia Wen, Aid to disabled children now outstrips welfare, BOSTON
GLOBE (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/08/27/cashdistributed-under-ssi-for-children-nowexceedswelfare/ek0peSWTLJ00YId0CONFYI/story.html (talking about the massive
growth in SSI payments, especially for qualified children and how much strain it is
putting on the system).
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B. STATE AND EMPLOYER-SPONSORED DISABILITY
PROGRAMS (SSDI)
In addition to being eligible for disability benefits under
SSDI, many states have different forms of short-term and longterm disability programs, which provide income replacement for
qualified disabilities.64 Additionally, many employers provide
short-term and long-term disability plans as one of the welfare
benefits they provide to their employees.65
SSDI can best be described as a related but separate
component of SSI, with a couple of important distinctions. First,
SSDI is an earned benefit provided to people with physical and
mental impairments that are severe enough to keep them from
carrying on in their regular jobs or from partaking in any other
type of work.66 For an impairment to be deemed severe enough,
it must be believed that it will last for one year at minimum, or
that it will inhibit a person throughout his or her life.67 Second,
there is a distinction in how the two programs receive funds:
SSDI is fuelled by Social Security taxes that workers, employers,
and the self-employed pay, whereas SSI gets paid out of the
Treasury Department’s general revenue.68 So even though SSI
and SSDI use the same definition to classify disabled adults,
SSDI focuses on impairment-based need, while SSI is for people
with very low income.69
Only five states provide short-term disability benefits
(sometimes called temporary disability insurance (TDI)):
California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island.70

64. See 2014 CDA Long Term Disability Claims Review, COUNCIL FOR
DISABILITY
AWARENESS,
8
(2014),
available
at
http://www.disabilitycanhappen.org/research/CDA_LTD_Claims_Survey_2014.pdf
(151 million workers had disability insurance coverage via SSDI at the end of 2013,
which represented a 0.2 percent increase from 2012).
65. 2013 Employee Benefits: An Overview of Employee Benefits Offerings in the
U.S., SOC. FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT 12 (Feb. 2013) [hereinafter 2013 Employee
Benefits]. Id.
66. See Stan Hinden, What’s the Difference Between SSDI and SSI?, AARP
BULLETIN (June 13, 2012), http://www.aarp.org/work/social-security/info-062012/social-security-disability-insurance-supplemental-securityincome.html
(comparing the key components of both SSDI and SSI).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See
State
Short-Term
Disability
Benefits,
NOLO.COM,
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/state-short-term-disability-benefits
(last
visited Apr. 22, 2015) (providing links to further reading about each state’s short-
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The purpose of such programs is to give people partial pay
replacement if they cannot work for more than three days due to
conditions such as injury, illness, or pregnancy.71 While it is just
one example, California administers its program through its
Employment Development Department, which requires all
employees to contribute to short-term disability via payroll
deductions.72 Through this structure, if someone cannot work
due to disability, that person can then get weekly payments
until she or he goes back to work or his or her benefits run out.73
More commonly, however, disability programs (outside of
SSDI) are provided by employers. In its 2013 review of claims
data, the Council for Disability Awareness, which is comprised of
nineteen insurance providers, found that more than 213,000
employers make long-term disability insurance available to their
employees.74 This is a marginal increase in terms of number of
providers, but the number of people who opt-in for coverage
declined by about 1.5%.75 Despite the decrease in coverage,
payment claims increased once again, up to $9.8 billion in
2013.76
The way that long-term disability typically works in the
employment context is that it is a voluntary benefit, meaning
that the employee pays the full cost of coverage.77 In the past,
however, many employers took it upon themselves to pay the full
cost, or at least pay for coverage up to a certain level.78
According to Barry Lundquist, president of the Council for
Disability Awareness, there are a few good reasons for the
change in how companies approach disability insurance, such as
“employers are focused on compliance with the new Affordable
term disability specifics).
71. Id.
72. Id
73. Id.
74. See Ashlea Ebeling, Disability Insurance: The Overlooked Employee Benefit,
FORBES
(June
19,
2014,
8:51
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2014/06/19/disability-insurance-theoverlooked-employee-benefit/ (discussing recent shifts in long-term disability
coverage and offerings, including the impact of voluntary versus involuntary
enrollment plans).
75. See id. (Only 32.1 million people had long-term disability coverage in 2013
compared to 34 million in 2009). 32 million is 22% of the current employed persons
of 146 million. So a little less than one in four working Americans have disability
coverage from their employer. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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Care Act’s health insurance provisions—so employers and
agents/brokers are saying they’ll deal with other benefits like
disability insurance later.”79 Another factor is tied back to
whether disability is a voluntary versus employer-driven benefit.
For voluntary (employee choice) plans, enrollment is about
40%.80 Of course for an employer-paid plan, employees are
automatically enrolled, but they are sometimes given the choice
if they want to increase coverage by making pay check
deferrals.81
C. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
The current United States unemployment insurance (UI)
system82 was enacted in 1935 as part of the New Deal program
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.83 The UI system provides
temporary, partial wage replacement for workers who are
unemployed through no fault of their own.84 The unemployment
compensation system is based on a joint federal-state scheme
that effectively encourages states to form their own UI
programs.85 Under this scheme, the federal government does
not directly provide UI benefits, but states receive federal
subsidies for their own UI programs.86 The source of federal
funding is a tax, currently set at 6.2% of the first $7,00087 in
wages, on every covered employee in the United States.88 Under
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act,89 an employer may offset
this federal tax with any state UI taxes it pays, up to 5.4% of the

79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting Lundquist about enrollment statistics).
81. Id. (mentioning various scenarios for people to think about when deciding
how much coverage is truly enough to cover expenses, etc.).
82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 501 504, 1101 1108 (2012).
83. The
New
Deal,
HISTORY
CHANNEL
(March
28,
2015),
http://www.history.com/topics/new-deal.
84. Lisa Lawler Graditor, Back to Basics: A Call to Re-Evaluate the
Unemployment Insurance Disqualification for Misconduct, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
27, 30–31 (2003) (describing the standard qualifications for receiving unemployment
insurance).
85. Gillian Lester, Unemployment Insurance and Wealth Redistribution, 49
UCLA L. REV. 335, 340 (2001).
86. See id. at 344 (describing how states receive federal administrative funds
and tax rebates for establishing UI programs).
87. For the purposes of this article all currency is noted in terms of the US
dollar.
88. 26 U.S.C. § 3301 (2012); see also 26 U.S.C. § 3306(b)(1) (2012).
89. 26 U.S.C. § 3301 (2012); see Walker supra note 45, at 2.
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$7,000 base wage.90 Not surprisingly, this incentive has proven
very effective, as every state currently has its own UI program.91
Yet, states have substantial flexibility in setting eligibility
criteria once minimum federal requirements have been met.92
The State of Wisconsin, which had the first unemployment
compensation system in the country,93 provides a good example
of how a “traditional” unemployment compensation system
works in the United States.94 Generally, Wisconsin bases UI
eligibility on a worker’s length of time in the workforce, how the
end of the employment relationship occurred, and the extent to
which the worker is looking for a new job.95 Workers who are
eligible for UI benefits frequently must wait a week before
receiving their benefit, and the maximum duration of benefit
receipt is usually twenty-six weeks.96
Benefits consist of
payments of up to 50% of the worker’s previous weekly wage,
capped by a statutory maximum.97
90. See FUTA Credit Reduction, IRS (last updated Oct. 24, 2014),
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&Self-Employed/FUTA-CreditReduction (explaining the FUTA tax credit for employers).
91. Lester, supra note 85, at 340.
92. See Amy B. Chasanov, Clarifying Conditions for Nonmonetary Eligibility in
the Unemployment Insurance System, 29 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 89, 89 (1996)
(describing the American unemployment insurance program as “a federal-state
program, where each state determines its own eligibility requirements with only
minimal requirements imposed by the federal government”).
93. Graditor, supra note 84, at 34 (describing how the Wisconsin legislature
rejected unemployment legislation ten times “before becoming the first state to enact
such legislation in 1932”).
94. See History of Unemployment Insurance in the United States, U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR (2010), http://www.dol.gov/ocia/pdf/75th-Anniversary-Summary-FINAL.pdf
(last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
95. See generally ST. OF WIS. DEP’T OF WORKFORCE DEV.: UNEMPLOYMENT INS.,
https://dwd.wisconsin.gov/uiben/before_menu.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
96. Monetary Entitlement, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING
ADMIN.,
C H.
3
(last
visited
Apr.
22,
2015)
http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/uilawcompar/2010/monetary.pdf. As a result
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, P.L. 111-5, passed by the US
Congress in February 2009, many unemployed people can receive up to 99 weeks of
unemployment insurance benefits. Still, there are those who run out of eligibility
before being able to find a new job. These individuals refer to themselves as “99ers.”
See 99ers, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/99ers (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
97. A typical maximum cap is one-half to one-third of the state’s average weekly
wage. Because of the maximum benefit caps, the effective rate of wage replacement
for employees receiving unemployment compensation benefits is about one-third of
their former salary. See Matthew Dimick, Labor Law, New Governance, and the
Ghent System, 90 N.C. L. REV. 319, 365 (2012) (“In the United States, the average
replacement rate is 36%.”); The Best States for Unemployment Benefits: Would You
Work If You Could Make $1,800 A Month Doing Nothing?, FINANCIAL SAMURAI (last
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The most significant disqualification factors for receiving
unemployment compensation are (1) whether the employee
voluntarily quit his or her employment,98 (2) whether he or she
was fired for “wilful misconduct,” (changed as of January 2014 to
“substantial misconduct,” a lower standard, at least in
Wisconsin),99 and (3) whether he or she did not continue to
search for work under the job search requirement.100 If any of
the three factors are applicable to the employee, the right to
benefits could be partially or completely terminated. As for the
job search requirement, a worker must be not only willing and
able to work, but must also actively seek a new job in order to
continue to receive unemployment compensation.101 Workers
must also accept suitable employment when found to be entitled
to unemployment compensation.102
Established during the New Deal, state job centers,
sometimes referred to as “labor exchanges,” help workers meet
the job search requirement.103 They function through “One-Stop
accessed
Apr.
22,
2015)
http://www.financialsamurai.com/best-states-forunemployment-benefits/.
98. Deborah Maranville, Changing Economy, Changing Lives: Unemployment
Insurance and the Contingent Workforce, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 291, 304 (1995).
99. Daniel R. Schuckers & James K. Bradley, Trends in Unemployment
Compensation Law, 78 PA. B.A. Q. 40, 42 (2007); Unemployment Law Changes for
Workers,
WIS.
DEP’T
OF
WORKFORCE
DEV.,
http://dwd.wisconsin.gov/uiben/lawchanges.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
100. See id. (describing the job search requirements for unemployment insurance
eligibility in Wisconsin).
101. EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMINISTRATION ADVISORY SYSTEM, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAM LETTER NO. 26-13,
REQUEST FOR CURRENT LAW ON STATE WORK SEARCH REQUIREMENTS (Apr. 10, 2014),
available at http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/dmstree/uipl/uipl2k13/uipl_2813.pdf;
26 U.S.C. § 3304 (2012). As far as the work search requirement in Wisconsin, there
is a basic requirement that benefit a claimant personally and diligently make a
reasonable search for suitable work. In some other instances, claimants are directed
to participate in reemployment programs. See WIS. STAT. § 108.04(2)(a). To meet
this requirement, claimants must file an online work search log, which may be
completed online at http://unemployment.wisconsin.gov. See State of Wisconsin
Department of Workforce Development, Unemployment Insurance: Part 4: Work
Search,
WIS.
DEP.T
OF
WORKFORCE
DEV.,
http://www.dwd.wisconsin.gov/uiben/handbook/english/contentspart4.htm (updated
Mar. 9, 2015).
102. See Knox v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 315 A. 2d 915,
916 (Pa. Cmwlth Ct. 1974) (denying unemployment compensation where employee
lost new job when he told prospective employer that he would go back to old job if
recalled from layoff).
103. See Thomas Janoski, Review of Three Cheers for the Unemployed:
Government and Unemployment before the New Deal, CONT. SOC., Vol. 22 No. 3 39293 (May 1993) http://www.jstor.org/stable/2074520.
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Career Centers,” which match unemployed workers with
suitable job positions, and also ensure that workers continue to
search for work while on unemployment.104
It is unlikely that participation by unions, such as in the
Ghent System where funding for unemployment benefits is
handled by trade unions and not governmental actors,105 will
ever happen.106 The reasons are at least two-fold. First, unions
are generally weak in the United States, where they make up
less than 7% of the private, non-agricultural workforce.107 Their
ability to push a union-based, Ghent-style system, even in states
with higher union density rates, is therefore questionable.
Second, and perhaps even more significantly, it is not clear at all
whether the federal Social Security Act in the United States
would permit a Ghent-style unemployment system in the United
States. Sections 303(a)(1) and (2) of the SSA establish that the
Secretary of Labor will not certify payments of federal funds to
states unless states provide such methods of administration as
are “‘found by the Secretary of Labor to be reasonably calculated
to insure full payment of unemployment compensation when
due’ and ‘[p]ayment of unemployment compensation solely
through public employment offices or such other agencies as the
Secretary of Labor may approve.’”108 Thus, to involve unions in
104. Louis S. Jacobson, Strengthening One-Stop Career Centers: Helping More
Unemployed Workers Find Jobs and Build Skills, THE HAMILTON PROJECT 5, (April,
2009); Cox, supra note 32 at 397.
105. See generally Paul M. Secunda, The Wagner Model of Labour Law is Dead–
Long Live Labour Law!, 38 QUEEN’S L.J. 545, 577-578 (2012-2013). Under the Ghent
System, “unions administer government-subsidized unemployment insurance funds,”
and the only way to get access to those funds is for a worker to join a union. Id.
Union density in countries that have this system is unsurprisingly high. Id.
106. But see Matthew Dimick, Paths to Power: Labor Law, Union Density, and
the Ghent System, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 41-49 (2012). Under the federal Social Security
Act, by contrast, the federal government leaves states with some discretion to
determine conditions for eligibility and the amount and duration of benefits for
public unemployment insurance programs. In states where labor unions hold more
favor and influence, state-level Ghent systems could be adopted and serve as
examples and catalysts for change elsewhere. Id.
107. United States Department of Labor, Union Members Summary, BUREAU OF
LABOR
STATISTICS
2010
(Jan.
21,
2009),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (finding that the union membership
rate for private sector workers was 6.9% in 2010); United States Department of
Labor, Union Members Summary, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 2014 (Apr. 4, 2015),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01212011.pdf (finding that the
union membership rate for private sector workers was 6.6% in 2014).
108. Dimick, supra note 97, at 368 69 (quoting Social Security Act § 303(a)(2),
42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(2) (2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 303(a)(2) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(2)
(2006)).
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unemployment compensation, the SSA would have to be
amended to certify payments to unions and to permit unions to
make payments when due. Such a scenario is highly unlikely in
the anti-union environment of the United States.109
D. SICKNESS AND FAMILY BENEFITS: THE FAMILY AND
MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (FMLA)
As noted above, the United States does not have a true
sickness social insurance benefit.
Instead, the federal
government mandated, via the FMLA enacted in 1993, that all
covered employers (with fifty or more employees in a seventyfive-mile radius) provide covered employees (who have worked
for the employer for at least one year, and more than 1250 hours
in the previous year) twelve weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave
for one of four covered situations.110 These situations include (1)
one’s own “serious health condition,” (2) the “serious health
condition” of a close family member (child, spouse—including
same-sex spouse—or parent), (3) the birth of a child, or (4) the
adoption or foster care of a child.111 A serious health condition is
defined as in-hospital treatment, treatment for chronic
conditions, conditions related to pregnancy, or continuing
treatment by a doctor for more than a three-day period (which
requires one doctor visit with a medical prescription or more
than one doctor visit).112
Although such Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)
provides sick leave, that leave is presumptively unpaid.113
Employers can force employees to use other sources of paid time
off (e.g., vacation and sick pay) to provide payment during this
leave time.114 Employers can also (1) define the twelve-month
period in which the worker receives the twelve weeks of leave

109. See Scott Martelle, Why Americans Support Both Unions and Right-to-Work
Laws,
L.A.
TIMES
(Aug.
29,
2014,
12:50
PM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-labor-organizing-gallup-wagesbenefits-20140829-story.html (relaying Gallup poll information showing Americans
varied feelings about unions – with 53% saying they support them, but 71% saying
they support right-to-work laws).
110. See generally The Family Medical Leave Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (last
visited Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/1421.htm.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(c) (2012).
114. The Family Medical Leave Act, supra note 110.
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(usually starting the first day of FMLA leave);115 (2) require
notification of the need for leave (though magic words invoking
FMLA are not required);116 (3) require medical certification of
the need for leave, and in the case of an employee’s own serious
health condition, require a fitness for duty certification to come
back to work;117 and (4) if the FMLA leave is for intermittent or
reduced leave, the employer may place the employee in a more
appropriate job during that time period.118 Employers are
supposed to keep employees on their current health insurance
plan during FMLA leave, but if the worker does not return from
leave, employers can ask for reimbursement of their insurance
contributions119 Finally, an employee cannot be terminated or
face adverse employment consequences for exercising his or her
rights under the FMLA, but the employer is free to eliminate his
or her position for non-FMLA related reasons.120
This is the extent of sickness benefits at the federal level in
the United States. There is no federally required sick pay or
maternity leave.121
As a result, a number of states and
municipalities have enacted their own laws to fill in the gap.122
For example, the city of San Francisco has a Paid Sick Leave
Ordinance that requires employees to earn one hour of sick leave
for every thirty hours worked, generally up to seventy-two hours
of accrued paid sick leave saved up at any time.123 Only three
states provide for paid maternity/family leave (California, New
Jersey, and Rhode Island).124 “All three states fund their
programs through employee-paid payroll taxes and are
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Carol Evans, Mandated Paid Maternity Leave: It’s Time to End the
Divide Between the ‘Haves’ and the ‘Have-Nots,’ HUFF. POST (June 24, 2014, 6:42
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carol-evans/mandated-paid-maternityleave_b_5525605.html (showing that only 16% of all U.S. companies offer paid
maternity leave).
122. Id. Only a few states, most notably California and New Jersey, have
mandated maternity leave for moms.
123. S.F., CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 12W.2(B)(C) (2014), available at
http://sfgsa.org/index.aspx?page=419; see Paid Sick Leave Ordinance- Fact Sheet,
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT,
http://sfgsa.org/index.aspx?page=419 (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
124. State Family Medical Leave Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Dec. 31,
2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-family-and-medicalleave-laws.aspx.
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administered through their respective disability programs.”125
More specifically, California provides:
Up to [twelve] weeks of unpaid family leave plus 4
months of maternity disability may be combined for a
total of [twenty-eight] weeks per year. The California
Paid Family Leave insurance program provides up to
[six] weeks of paid leave to care for a seriously ill child,
spouse, parent, or registered domestic partner, or to
bond with a new child.
The benefit amount is
approximately 55% of an employee’s weekly wage, from
a minimum of $50 to a maximum of $1067. The
program is funded through employee-paid payroll taxes
and is administered through the state’s disability
program.126
Connecticut is the only state that provides for paid sick
leave for private sector employers that have fifty or more
employees and requires up to forty hours of paid sick leave
annually, depending on the number of hours employees work.127
Other states have their own family and medical leave acts that
may apply to smaller employers and to more employees, but
generally, these acts only provide unpaid leave.128
E. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE
UNITED STATES
1. Public Health Social Insurance Programs
The two public health insurance programs in the United

125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Wisconsin Family and Medical Leave Act, ST. OF WIS. DEP’T OF
WORKFORCE DEV., https://dwd.wisconsin.gov/er/family_and_medical_leave/ (last
visited Apr. 29, 2015) (providing that “employers with 50 or more permanent
employees must allow employees of either sex up to six (6) weeks of leave in a
calendar year for the birth or adoption of a child, up to two (2) weeks of leave in a
calendar year for the care of a child, spouse, parent, domestic partner, as defined in
§§ 40.02(1) or 770.01(1), parent of a domestic partner with a serious health condition
and up to two (2) weeks of leave in a calendar year for the employee’s own serious
health condition.”); see also Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), TEXAS
WORKFORCE
COMMISSION
http://www.twc.state.tx.us/news/efte/family_and_medical_leave_act_fmla.html (last
visited Oct. 5, 2014) (operating in a very similar fashion to both the federal
standards, as well as other states).
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States are Medicare and Medicaid.129
Medicare provides
approximately 50 million sixty-five-and-older and disabled130
Americans with hospital,131 medical,132 and prescription drug133
coverage.134 Currently, non-public actors play no role in the
administration of the Medicare scheme, but private healthcare
providers of all types receive payment for their medical services
through this program.135 Medicaid, on the other hand, is not

129. Medicare and Medicaid were formally enacted amendments (Titles XVIII
and XIX, respectively) to the Social Security Act (1935) and went into effect in 1966.
Medicare falls under Title 42
The Public Health and Welfare Chapter 7
Social
Security Subchapter Xviii Health Insurance For Aged and Disabled. See also The
Basics of Social Security, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE (July 2013),
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0713fact.pdf.
There really is not a
separate sickness benefit program in the United States. Although employees may
receive sick leave as part of their employment, they are generally not entitled to sick
leave as a matter of federal or most state laws. Instead, they have a right to
protected, unpaid job leave for: (1) their own serious health conditions, (2) the serious
health condition of an immediate family member, or (3) for the birth or adoption of a
child, under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA); 29 U.S.C. §§
2601, 2611-2619, 2651- 2653.
130. See Sean M. Novak, How to Create and Maintain a Medicare Set-Aside
Trust, LOS ANGELES LAWYER, March 2012, at 15 (citing Medicare Eligibility
Guidelines,
SSA
Pub.
No.
05-1004)
(June
2011),
http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10043.html). To qualify for Medicare under the disability
category, “an individual must submit an application showing that he or she is
[eighteen] years old or older, has worked in jobs covered by Social Security, and has a
medical condition that has prevented the applicant from working (or is expected to
prevent the applicant from working) for at least [twelve] months or end in death.” Id.
131. Sandra J. Carnahan, Medicare’s Coverage with Study Participation Policy:
Clinical Trials or Tribulations?, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 229, 224
(2007); see also Novak, supra note 130.
132. Id. “Part A, or Hospital Insurance (HI), includes hospital, skilled nursing,
home health, and hospice care. Medicare Part B, or the Supplementary Medical
Insurance Program (MI), includes physician and other out-patient services. Part C,
or Medicare Advantage, is a managed care option added by the Balanced Budget Act
of 1997 . . . .” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395d (2003) (Part A); 42 U.S.C. § 1395j (2012)
(Part B); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-21-28 (2003) (Part C or Medicare Advantage Plans)).
133. In 2003, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 111 Stat. 2066 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101),
expanded the Medicare program by creating Medicare Part D, a prescription drug
benefit that came into full effect in 2006.
134. See Carnahan, supra note 131, at 234. “[T]here are currently over 47.5
million Americans covered by Medicare, of whom 39.6 million are aged 65 and older,
and 7.9 million are disabled. Total benefits paid in 2010 were $516 billion.” Novak,
supra note 130. Such coverage is financed through an employer/employee Medicare
Tax. This tax has “increased from 0.6 [%] in 1970 on a maximum taxable amount of
$7,800 of annual earnings to 1.45 [%] in 2011 with no cap on the maximum amount
of annual earnings subject to the tax.” See EBRI Databook, supra note 34, at 5.
135. Eleanor D. Kinney, The Medicare Appeals System for Coverage and Payment
Disputes: Achieving Fairness in a Time of Constraint, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1987).
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strictly a social insurance program. It is a federal-state, jointfinanced program for low-income, seriously ill and disabled
individuals.136 At its heart, Medicaid requires states to receive
and process all Medicaid applications and to provide medical
services to eligible individuals.137
Medicaid is not a subsidy scheme for clinics and hospitals,
but instead a third-party payment system structured to operate
like insurance, paying participating healthcare professionals and
institutions for covered services furnished to enrolled persons.138
Recently, the federal government began to play a less significant
role in its administration, and states are gaining more discretion
to keep poor Americans off their Medicaid rolls in order to reign
in the spiralling cost of Medicaid coverage.139
Private actors, such as employers and unions, play a large
role in the private employer-based health insurance system.
There historically has been little regulation of employer-based
health plans and employers have “great discretion in
determining eligibility criteria and what benefits to offer under
such plans”, although this is beginning to change with the
passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010.140 Unions, for their

136. See Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting Structure and Meaning
in a Post-Deficit Reduction Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 6, 9 (2006)
(“Medicaid rest[s] on a financial base consisting of a shared federal/state contribution
arrangement, with the federal government as the senior partner.”); See also id. at 10
(“Medicaid follow[s] the tradition of federal grant-in-aid programs, enacted pursuant
to Congress’s spending clause powers, which condition the receipt of federal funds by
states that elect to participate on compliance with a series of structural and
operation conditions of participation.”).
137. Id. at 12.
138. Cf. Peter Ubel, Why Many Physicians Are Reluctant To See Medicaid
Patients,
FORBES
(Nov.
7,
2013,
11:02
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterubel/2013/11/07/why-many-physicians-arereluctant-to-see-medicaid-patients/. Some physicians admit their reluctance in
seeing Medicaid patients due to reimbursement payments. On average, Medicaid
pays roughly 61% of what Medicare pays for outpatient services. Id. “Physicians
interviewed in the study explained that they felt it was their duty to see some
amount of Medicaid patients in their practice. They recognized the moral need to
provide care for this population. But they did not want to commit career suicide–
they did not want good deeds to bankrupt their clinical practices.” Id.
139. See The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in States that Do Not Expand
Medicaid, Henry J. Kaiser Family Found. (Apr. 2, 2014), http://kff.org/healthreform/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-do-notexpand-medicaid/ (detailing statistics about which states expanded Medicaid
coverage, along with coverage and economic consequences from those decision).
140. See RICHARD A. BALES ET AL., UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT LAW 209
(LEXISNEXIS 2007); See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education
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part, play a significant role with multi-employer health plans,
where health insurance is provided as part of a collective
bargaining agreement.141 There is no close linkage between
union and employer-provided health insurance and Medicare
and Medicaid in the United States, as is sometimes seen in other
countries’ social insurance programs.142
If Americans are not covered by Medicare or Medicaid, there
is no national health insurance system to rely on.143 Instead,
individuals not covered by either Medicare or Medicaid must
receive health insurance through their employer or purchase it
on the open market, which historically has been prohibitively
expensive.144
Otherwise, the person will be uninsured.
Approximately 42 million Americans, or about 13% of the
population, currently have no health insurance.145
Medicare, like Social Security, is facing significant financial
troubles. According to the most recent Trustees’ Report:
The Trustees project that the Medicare Hospital
Insurance (HI) Trust Fund will be the next to face
depletion after the DI Trust Fund. The projected date of
HI Trust Fund depletion is 2030, four years later than
projected in last year’s report. At that time dedicated
revenues will be sufficient to pay 85 [%] of HI costs.146

Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029; See also infra notes
135 141 and accompanying text.
141. A multiemployer health plan is sponsored by more than one employer under
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement for the benefit of union members. See
29 U.S.C. § 1002(37) (2012). Under section 302(c)(5) of the Taft Hartley Amendments
of 1947, multiemployer benefits plans must be established in trust to provide
employee benefits to union employees. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29
U.S.C. section 186(c)(5) (2010). No such multiemployer health plan arrangements
currently exist in the Medicare or Medicaid program.
142. See generally infra Part III on the social protections benefit system in the
Netherlands.
143. See Rosenbaum, supra note 136, at 7 (“Among industrial democracies, the
United States Stands alone in relying on voluntary markets to insure most of the
population.”).
144. Id. (“With the cost of employer-sponsored family coverage hovering at
$10,000 in 2004
among employers that elect to offer any coverage
private
insurance is unaffordable to millions of people.”).
145. See Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act—CBO’s April
2014
Baseline,
Cong.
Budget
Office
(Apr.
14,
2014),
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43900-2014-04ACAtables2.pdf (pulling data from Table 2, “Effects of the Affordable Care Act on
Health Insurance Coverage”).
146. Social Security and Medicare Board of Trustees, A Summary of the 2014
Annual Reports; Status of the Social Security and Medicare Programs, SOC. SEC.
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On the other hand, other Parts of Medicare appear to be in
better shape (though the cost of healthcare in the United States
continues to grow at a startling pace):
The Trustees project that Part B of Supplementary
Medical Insurance (SMI), which pays doctors’ bills and
other outpatient expenses, and Part D of SMI, which
provides access to prescription drug coverage, will
remain adequately financed into the indefinite future
because current law automatically provides financing
each year to meet the next year’s expected costs.
However, the aging population and rising health care
costs cause SMI projected costs to grow steadily from
1.9 [%] of GDP in 2013 to approximately 3.3 [%] of GDP
in 2035, and then more slowly to 4.5 [%] of GDP by
2088.147
2. Government-Regulated Private Health Insurance
In response to this healthcare quandary, President Obama
signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA),148 which hopes to reform the public and private provision
of health insurance in the United States and cover an additional
32 million people in public and private programs.
More
specifically, the ACA will require that an essential health
benefits package be offered by qualified health benefit plans,
which must include specific categories of benefits, certain costsharing standards, and provide certain levels of coverage.149
However, essential health benefits are contingent upon whether
a health benefit plan is grandfathered or non-grandfathered, and
insured or self-insured. A self-insured plan is one in which the
employer pays for each claim out of pocket compared to an
insured plan, where the company would pay a fixed premium to
an insurance company.150
A grandfathered plan allows
ADMIN., available at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/trsum/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2015).
147. Id.
148. . Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (ACA).
149. . Paul M. Secunda, The Forgotten Employee Benefit Crisis: Multiemployer
Benefit Plans on the Brink, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 98 (2011) (citing CH
EDITORIAL STAFF, CCH’S LAW, EXPLANATION, AND ANALYSIS OF THE PATIENT
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ¶ 2205, at 969 (2010)).
150. See Self-Insured Group Health Plans, SELF-INSURANCE INSTITUTE OF
AMERICA,
INC.
(last
visited
Apr.
29,
2015),
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companies who had a health benefit plan in place prior to March
23, 2010 to maintain their plan from that time so long as they do
not encounter a trigger event that would force it to lose that
status, such as (1) significantly cutting or reducing benefits, (2)
significantly raising deductibles or co-pays, or (3) lowering
employer contributions.151 A non-grandfathered plan would be
one that was instituted after March 23, 2010, or one that faced a
status-changing event.152
The biggest similarities between
grandfathered and non-grandfathered plans are that (1) the
waiting period before coverage is effective cannot exceed ninety
days, (2) there are no dollar limits on essential health benefits,
and (3) there are no pre-existing condition limits for
participants, no matter their age.153 The key differences are that
grandfathered plans (1) do not have to cover ten essential health
benefits (EHBs) for individuals and insured smaller employers
(less than fifty employees starting in 2016), (2) can deny women
and children immediate access to gynaecological and pediatric
care, and (3) do not have to provide immunizations and
preventive care on a first dollar basis.154
State-based and federal-based American Health Benefit
Exchanges (“Exchanges”) were established starting in 2014.155
http://www.siia.org/i4a/pages/Index.cfm?pageID=4546 (answering the “what is a selfinsured health plan?” question).
151. See
Grandfathered
Status
Fact
Sheet,
CIGNA,
http://www.cigna.com/assets/docs/about-cigna/informed-on-reform/grandfatheredplan-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2014) (listing a variety of trigger events that
would change an employer’s status).
152. Id.
153. The Association for Convenience & Fuel Retailing, Overview of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act: What Small Business NACS Members need to
Know
About
Obamacare,
NACS
4,
http://www.nacsonline.com/advocacy/ComplianceResources/Documents/HealthcareS
mallBusinesses.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2015); see also Elizabeth Weeks Leonard,
Can You Really Keep Your Health Plan? The Limits of Grandfathering Under the
Affordable Care Act, 36 J. CORP. L. 753, 766-67 (2011).
154. Id.; see also COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 367-68 (4th ed. 2015) (taking each new requirement for
non-grandfathered plans in turn, noting that they are additional requirements
beyond the scope of grandfathered plans).
155. See Building the Health Insurance Marketplace, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGIS., http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/american-health-benefit-exchanges.aspx
(updated May 19, 2014) (“The Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires that health
insurance exchanges be established in every state by January 1, 2014. The central
purpose of these new Marketplaces is to enable low and moderate income
individuals, and small employers to obtain affordable health coverage. Individuals
and small business will be able to purchase private health insurance through a
variety of insurance Marketplace models throughout the United States.”
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Small Business Health Options Program (SHOP) Exchanges, on
the other hand, will only become fully functional in 2015.156
Through the Exchanges, individuals may purchase qualified
health coverage.157 Even though there are conditions to such
programs, they leave open some general flexibility for people
when choosing health insurance (including the benefits package
itself, along with price variations) because they are not directly
mandated by the government.158 Additionally, effective in full at
the beginning of 2016,159 ACA began operating on a play-or-pay
system, meaning that large employers (those with at least fifty
full-time employees working thirty or more hours per week)
must either provide 95% of their full-time employees “minimum
essential coverage” or face a penalty.160 The penalty is to help
employees receive health benefits on federal or state health
exchanges (starting in 2016, the penalty will be $2,000 per
employee, for every employee beyond the first thirty, for large
employers that fail to offer minimum essential coverage to 95%

156. See Christine Vestal, Health Law May Benefit More Small Businesses in the
Fall,
Kaiser
Health
News
(Aug.
28,
2014),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2014/August/28/Health-Law-May-BenefitMore-Small-Businesses-In-The-Fall.aspx (citing the Obama administration’s decision
to postpone Oct. 1, 2014, nationwide launch because it needed to fix “serious
technical problems with the exchanges.”).
157. Sam Solomon, Health Exchange Federalism: Striking the Balance Between
State Flexibility and Consumer Protection in ACA Implementation, 34 CARDOZO 2073,
2074 (2013).
158. See Evi Heilbrunn, Wisconsin Health Insurance, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, http://health.usnews.com/health-insurance/wisconsin (last updated June 12,
2014) (using Wisconsin’s system as an example and comparing government-approved
plans compared to private market health plans – noting price as the biggest
difference).
159. Employer
Mandate
Fact
Sheet,
CIGNA,
http://www.cigna.com/assets/docs/about-cigna/informed-on-reform/employermandate-fact-sheet.pdf?WT.z_nav=health-care-reform%2Femployermandate%3BBody%3BRead%20the%20Employer%20Mandate%20Fact%20Sheet
(last visited May 4, 2015); see Diving In to the Affordable Care Act’s “Pay or Play”
Provisions,
Carr,
Riggs
&
Ingram
(last
updated
July
2013),
http://www.cricpa.com/AffordableCareActsPayOrPlayProvisions.aspx?mobile=1
(citing the updated implementation date of the employer shared-responsibility
(“play-or-pay”) provision – moving by one year from Jan. 1, 2014 to Jan. 1, 2015).
Transitional relief granted by the federal government in February 2014 will mean
that the employer is gradually implemented. See also MEDILL supra note 154, at 375
(explaining the structure of the $2,000 penalty for non-compliance).
160. See Employer Mandate Fact Sheet, supra note 159; but see Roberton
Williams, Good and Bad News About the ACA Penalty Tax, FORBES (June 12 2014,
10:02
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2014/06/12/good-and-bad-newsabout-the-aca-penalty-tax/ (talking about the ramifications of the penalty, but most
importantly noting that millions will try to avoid payments altogether).

PENNINGS (DO NOT DELETE)

10/1/15 10:30 AM

2015]ADMINISTRATION OF SOCIAL PROTECTION BENEFITS 343

of their full-time workers).161 There is also a $3,000 “free rider”
penalty per employee if the health insurance offered by
employers is not considered “affordable,” which means that
employee contributions constitute more than 9.5% of annual
household income or the employer does not pay for at least 60%
of the cost (minimal actuarial value) of the health insurance
provided.162 Moreover, very large employers, those with more
than two hundred employees, will eventually be required to
automatically enroll employees into health insurance plans
offered by the employer (though employees may opt out of
coverage).163
The so-called ACA “individual mandate,” which requires all
Americans to be covered by some form of health insurance or
face tax penalties, recently survived legal constitutional
challenges brought against it by conservative opponents.164 On
the other hand, a planned, mandatory expansion of Medicaid
was found unconstitutional and individual states have the right
to stay in the old Medicaid program without jeopardizing their
previous Medicaid funding.165 Some are also pushing to expand
Medicare coverage to all individuals, referred to as the “single
161. See Pub. L. No. 111-146, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); see also MEDILL, supra note
154, at 357.
162. See Emily Maltby, What the Health Care Decision Means for Your Small
Business,
Wall
St.
J.
(June
28,
2013),
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230356150457749458238182518
6 (answering the question about “unaffordable” coverage and $3,000 per employee
penalty); see also MEDILL, supra note 154, at 378 (stating that the penalty is in
place because if the plan is unaffordable, then an employee would be better served by
buying “an individual health insurance policy through the Exchange system using
premium assistance tax credits”); see also Paul Secunda, Employee Benefits Law;
Policy and Practice.
163. See Pub L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); see also MEDILL, supra note
154, at 370 (citing the opt-out provision but also that if the employer offers more
than one plan, a default plan may be chosen for the auto-enrollment).
164. National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,
2067 (2012). For the most part, ACA was held to be constitutional by the US
Supreme Court in Sebelius. Certain provisions which would have required states to
spend more on Medicaid were struck down as unconstitutional in violation of the US
Constitution’s Spending Power Clause. See id. at 2607 (“Nothing in our opinion
precludes Congress from offering funds under the Affordable Care Act to expand the
availability of health care, and requiring that States accepting such funds comply
with the conditions on their use. What Congress is not free to do is to penalize States
that choose not to participate in that new program by taking away their existing
Medicaid funding.”).
165. Id. at 2365 (holding that “the threat to withhold a large amount of funds
from one program ‘leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce [in a newly
created program],’ The Chief Justice concludes, the Medicaid expansion is
unconstitutionally coercive.”).
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payer” model.166 In such a system, Medicare would provide a
national baseline of healthcare coverage for all Americans.167
This proposal has absolutely no chance of passing through
Congress, given the polarized environment. On the conservative
side, a group of Republican Senators have proposed a plan which
would replace “the current open-ended, fee-for-service Medicare
with enrollment of seniors in the Federal Employees Health
Benefits Plan (FEHBP).”168 The FEHBP “offers an array of
privately-run health insurance plans.”169 But that plan has gone
nowhere in Congress.170
III.

SOCIAL PROTECTION BENEFIT SYSTEM IN THE
NETHERLANDS

In this Part, we will describe the development of the Dutch
social protection system. Subsequently, the various risks will be
outlined in the same order as in Part II.
During World War II, several plans were made for a better
world after the war, in reaction to the economic crisis in the
1930s and the effects it had on society. This also was the case in
the United Kingdom, where the Dutch government was in exile
during the war. In the UK, a commission chaired by the civil
servant William Beveridge, developed a blueprint for a future
166. See What is Single Payer? PHYSICIANS FOR A NAT’L HEALTH REFORM (2015),
http://www.pnhp.org/facts/what-is-single-payer (explaining the single payer system
of healthcare, and asking for assistance and support in establishing such a system in
the United States).
167 See Jacob S. Hacker, Better Medicine: Fixing the Left’s Healthcare
Prescription,
SLATE
(Oct.
10,
2006),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2006/10/better_
medicine.html (“Paul Krugman has written a steady stream of pieces calling for a
single public insurer like Medicare. Liberal stalwarts Sen. Ted Kennedy and Rep.
John Dingell
who've each proposed various complicated compromise plans in the
past
have teamed up to introduce the Medicare for All Act, which would, in
Kennedy's words, “expand Medicare over the next decade to cover every citizen
from birth to the end of life.”). In other words, such legislation would do nothing less
than enact European-style national health insurance.
168. Tom Curry, In Risky Election-Year Move Republicans Offer Medicare
Alternatives,
NBC
NEWS
(Mar.
15,
2012),
http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/03/15/10704915-in-risky-election-yearmove-republicans-offer-medicare-alternatives?chromedomain=usnews.
169. .See id. Another conservative proposal would “raise the Medicare eligibility
age (to 67, not 70) and subsidize seniors so they could purchase private insurance
plans.” Id.
170. GOP Plans for Medicare, Health Reform Repeal Draw Scrutiny, KAISER
HEALTH
NEWS
(Mar.
18,
2012),
http://kaiserhealthnews.org/morningbreakout/medicare-republicans-ryan/.
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social security system titled the Beveridge Report.171 It leveraged
the term “social security” from the Social Security Act adopted
shortly before the war in the United States in 1935.172 The
Beveridge Report proposed that the future social security system
should be universal in that it would cover all categories of the
population.173 Inspired by this report, the Dutch government
established the Commission Van Rhijn, which had the task of
sketching the foundations of the future Dutch social security
system.174 In its report, Sociale Zekerheid (Social Security),175
the Commission proposed a new legal basis for the system,
which turned out to be very important for the development of
Dutch social security, as we will see below. Under this scheme,
the state was responsible for social security and the protection
against poverty for all of its members (now replaced by the term
“citizen”).176 The provision of universal social security, in turn,
required that individuals do all that they reasonably could to
protect themselves against poverty through their own efforts.177
This was an important change after the previous approach,
where the state was reticent in interfering in society and
providing income protection. The new approach was widely
endorsed, and the responsibility of the state for guaranteeing
social welfare was laid down in the Constitution.178
The text of legal basis accepted by the Dutch government
and parliament made it possible to extend the scope of social
protection beyond the category of employees, and required the
state to be responsible for the whole population, since it now
171. See Beveridge, supra note 21.
172. See infra at 316.
173. Beveridge, supra note 21.
174. The Dutch Commission Van Rhijn, Commission for Social Security Report,
THE HAGUE NATIONAL ARCHIVES (Mar. 26, 1943) (establishing general guidelines for
the future development of social insurance in the Netherlands).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. In the Constitution of 1814 it was mentioned that the poor were the concern
of the government. Currently, Article 20 of the present Constitution gives a broader
responsibility:
It shall be the concern of the authorities to secure the means of subsistence of the
population and to achieve the distribution of wealth. 2. Rules concerning entitlement
to social security shall be laid down by Act of Parliament. 3. Dutch nationals resident
in the Netherlands who are unable to provide for themselves shall have a right, to be
regulated by Act of Parliament, to aid from the authorities. Grondwet voor het
Koninkrijk der Nederlanden van 24 augustus 1815, Stb. 45, zoals deze wet laatstelijk
laatstelijk is gewijzigd bij de Wet van 25 februari 1999, Stb. 133, 134 en 135
(Constitution of the Netherlands, hereinafter Gw).
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refers to all “members of the society.”
This led to the
introduction of insurance schemes covering all residents,
including the self-employed and persons not working. The first
of these schemes was the Algemene Ouderdomswet (AOW
General Old-Age Pensions Law), which came into force on
January 1, 1957.179 Soon after this date, two national insurance
schemes were adopted—widow’s benefits (survivor’s scheme) and
family’s benefits.180 Both the old age scheme and the survivor’s
benefit scheme provide for flat-rate benefits.181
Additionally, an Unemployment Benefits Act (called
Werkloosheidswet) was passed in 1949.182 The unemployment
scheme insured all employees against unemployment, providing
a benefit up to 80% of the previous wage (up to a ceiling),
payable for six months.183 This was administered, as was
regulated in this Act, by bedrijfsverenigingen, the associations of
employees’ and employers’ representatives mentioned earlier.184
In
1966,
Parliament
adopted
the
Wet
op
de
arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering (WAO Law Relating to
Insurance against Incapacity for Work).185
The WAO, a
disability
law,
was
also
administered
by
the
bedrijfsverenigingen, as was regulated in this Act.186
As for health care, in the 1970s, Parliament adopted health
care regulations limited to employees with an income below the
statutory ceiling.187 In addition, Parliament adopted a national
179. Algeme Ouderdomswet (AOW), HISTORIEK, (Oct. 12, 2009) available at
historiek.net/algemene-ouderdomswet-aow/5966/ (in Dutch); see also Art. 20 AOW
(May
31,
1956),
available
at
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBV0001560/geldigheidsdatum_30-08-2014 (in Dutch);
see generally http://www.overheid.nl for text of all Acts, in Dutch.
180. Office of Retirement and Disability Policy, Social Security Programs
Throughout the World: Europe 2012, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., (last accessed Apr. 29,
2015),
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/20122013/europe/netherlands.html.
181. Id.; Wim van Oorschot and Cees Boos, Nagelaten betrekkingen in de sociale
verzekering. Terug naar af?, De Gemeenschap is aansprakelijk…’ 100 jaar sociale
verzekering 1901-2001, 225 (Vermande, 2001).
182. De Werkloosheidswet Nov. 1949 Stb. 1949, 423. A brief description of the
law
can
be
found
at,
http://www.stvda.nl/~/media/Files/Stvda/Brochures/1950_1959/1952/19520400.ashx.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Wet op de arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering, Stb. 1966, 84 (Law on
Disability Insurance), available at http://www.overheid.nl (in Dutch).
186. Art. 66 WAO (Disability Act).
187. Ziekenfondswet, Stb. 1964, 392 (Sickness Fund Act); see also MEASURING
UP: IMPROVING HEALTH SYSTEM PERFORMANCE IN OECD COUNTRIES 119 (OECD
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insurance scheme for the high medical costs that employees and
private insurers were believed to be not able to bear, for
example: long-term hospital care or stay in nursing homes.188
Thus, after World War II, the Dutch system of social
protection increased considerably, as economic growth after the
war enabled the government to absorb the costs of these
schemes. However, when economic growth slowed down in the
1970s (oil crisis) and 1980s (structural problems requiring
important enterprise restructuring), the number of benefit
recipients grew steadily while the funds decreased.189
In the 1990s, policy makers became aware that social
security acts enabled employers and others to also use them for
unintended purposes that were deemed no longer desirable by
the legislature.190 For instance, if an employer had a conflict
with an employee, it was a cheap solution to send this employee
home “sick” because the wage costs were reimbursed by the
sickness benefit fund.191 To some extent, such an employee
would indeed often feel ill (i.e., stressed), but such situations
could, in principle, be solved by giving the employee other work
to do or getting that employee a colleague to assist her or him.
However, since the Sickness Benefit Act was bearing the costs,
there was no financial incentive for the employer to find a
solution.192 This perpetuated a cycle wherein the employee
would remain in the scheme for a long time, believing she or he
was really ill until she or he was finally deemed disabled. For
this reason, “activation” became the new term: the system was to
activate people to make as little use of the benefit as possible by
encouraging (and forcing) them to take responsibility for
themselves.193
Additionally, disability benefits were paid out more
generously than intended.194 In order to find a compensation for

Publications, 2002).
188. Id.
189. See generally Marcel Einerhand et al., SICKNESS AND INVALIDITY
ARRANGEMENTS (VUGA, 1995).
190. See generally Belang en Beleid. Naar een verantwoordelijke uitvoering van
de werknemersverzekeringen, (SDU-uitgeverij, 1994) (explaining the distribution of
responsibilities of benefit administration; see also Sanneke Kuipers, THE CRISIS
IMPERATIVE: CRISIS RHETORIC AND WELFARE STATE REFORM IN BELGIUM AND THE
NETHERLANDS IN THE EARLY 1990S, 131-132 (Amsterdam University Press, 2006).
191. Id. at 134.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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victims of mass dismissals in Dutch workplaces in the 1970s and
1980s, in a considerable number of cases disability benefits were
awarded to persons who became redundant.195
These examples show that the costs of particular decisions
could be shifted to the benefit system. A consensus emerged
that responsibilities had to be re-ordered196 and that those who
could influence the risk of becoming disabled should be given
incentives to reduce that risk.197 Also the employers’ and
employees’ associations did not feel the necessary economic
incentives to reduce reliance on the benefit system. In order to
end the influence by those who do not have to bear the costs of
the decisions, the employers’ and employees’ associations
(organized in the bedrijfsverenigingen) were completely removed
from benefit administration.198 After a short period in which it
was thought that the system should be privatized (i.e.
administered by private insurance companies), the government
decided that the system should become public, with strict
supervision and control by the Minister of Social Affairs.199 One
major reason for coming to this conclusion was that assessing a
person’s incapacity for work was such an essential element of
receiving benefits that public responsibility should be
maintained.200 Therefore, the administration could not be left to
private companies, especially because they would have a conflict
of interest in wanting to reduce benefit costs.201 For this reason,
the Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen (UWV)
(benefit administration employees’ schemes) was established.202
195. Id. at 135.
196. See Verantwoordelijkheidsverdeling sociale zekerheid, SER, (Jan. 1994)
https://www.ser.nl/~/media/files/internet/publicaties/overige/1990_1999/1994/b01080.
ashx. The Social Economic Council is a tripartite (i.e. consisting of representatives
of employers and employees organizations and independent experts appointed by the
minister of social affairs) with the task (inter alia) to advise the government on socioeconomic issues. Id.
197. See Belang en beleid, supra note 154.
198. Wet uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en inkomen, Stb. 2001, 264 (Act on the
administration of work and income).
199. R.J. van der Veen, et al., L’histoire se répète? Honderd jaar
uitvoeringsorganisatie
sociale
verzekeringen,
De
gemeenschap
is
aansprakelijk…Honderd jaar sociale verzekering, Koninklijke vermande, 2001.
200. See id. at 78; see generally P.S. Fluit, Verzekeringen van solidariteit,
Netherlands, Kluwer, 2001; see also Frans Pennings, Dutch Social Security Law in
an International Context, Kluwer Law International, 2002 (providing a general
overview of the system)
201. R. J. van der Veen, supra note 200.
202. Wet structuur uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en inkomen 29 Nov. 2001, Stb.
2001, 624 (SUWI).
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Currently, this is a national organization that administers the
disability, sickness, and unemployment benefit schemes (as well
as a few other minor schemes).203
In addition to the schemes mentioned above, there is a
general public assistance act that provides for a subsistence
income, which, for couples, is at the level of the statutory
minimum wage.204 As of July 2014, the gross amount is $
1,855.205 For single persons, the amount is in principle 70% of
this (and for single parents, it is 90%).206 These subsistence
benefits take the income of the person concerned and that of a
spouse (or equated person) into account, as well as any capital
above a certain threshold.207
A. OLD-AGE PENSIONS
1. The National Old-Age Pension Act
The Algemene Ouderdomswet (General Old Age Pension
was already mentioned in the previous section; it is the
Act, introduced shortly after the Second World War as part of
the project to introduce schemes protecting the full population,
not only workers.209 Benefits are flat-rate and are at the
subsistence level (the same rates as discussed under the Public
assistance act, see previous section).210
The benefits are
financed on the basis of contributions paid by all residents,
depending on whether they have an income (those who do not
have an income are protected in the same way as contribution
payers).211
This general system also provides protection to those who
have never worked, those who have large gaps in their careers,
and those who are self-employed. Since the old-age benefit rates
and the subsistence benefits are basically the same, pensioners,
in principle, do not have to rely on public assistance.
Act)208

203. Wet uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en inkomen, supra note 199. It is regulated
by the new Act. See Wet structuur uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en inkomen, supra
note 202.
204. Art. 3:21 WWB (Public Assistance Act).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Art. 31-34 WWB.
208. Algemene ouderdomswet, Stb. 1956, 281 (General Old Age Pension Act).
209. Art. 6 AOW.
210. Art. 9 AOW.
211. Art. 82-83 WFSV (Act on financing of social insurance schemes).
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Benefits are financed on a PAYG basis.212 Since the greying
of the population raised concerns on financing in the future, the
pension age was raised in 2014.213 The pension age had been
sixty-five for both women and men alike.214 In the future, it will
gradually rise to sixty-seven; further increases are possible if
figures show that life expectancy has increased further.215 It is
now generally believed that the system is sustainable because of
this dynamic increase of pension age, which is not viewed as
unreasonable now that people at the age of sixty-five are, in
general, much healthier than when the act was adopted in
1957.216
Survivors’ benefits fall under a separate act, the Algemene
nabestaandenwet (General Survivors’ Benefits Act).217 This act
provides for benefits comparable to those of the AOW.218
Benefits take the income of the survivor into account, and only
certain categories of survivors are eligible for benefits (born
before 1950, or being partially disabled or having children under
eighteen).219
2. Supplementary Old-Age Pensions
Although the Old Age Benefits Act has an important
function to protect all pensioners against poverty (with benefits
that are relatively high, compared to other European countries),
these benefits only partially compensate the loss of income for
those who previously earned higher incomes, since benefits are
flat-rate only. For this reason, employers’ and employees’
organizations made arrangements in many sectors to establish
occupational pensions. Because of the minimum level of the
statutory pensions and the absence of statutory earnings-related
pensions, the expanse of supplementary pensions in the

212. Federation of the Dutch Pension Funds, Collectivity Solidarity: the evolution
and position of collective pensions in the Netherlands, 22 (The Hague, 2011),
www.pensionfederatie.nl?Document/Publicaties/English%20publications/VoorsElkaa
r_EN.pdf; see also Art. 81-83 WFSV.
213. Joris Beermaert and Corine Hoekstra, Raising the real retirement age, THE
ACTUARY (May 8, 2014), available at www.theactuary.com/features/2014/05/raisingthe-real-retirement-age/; Art. 7 AOW; Stb. 2013, 316.
214. Art. 7 AOW.
215. Art. 7a AOW.
216. See Beermaert, supra note 213.
217. Algemene nabestaandenwet, Stb. 1995, 690.
218. Art. 17 ANW.
219. Art. 14 ANW.
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Netherlands is relatively large compared to countries that have
a statutory earnings-related system.220
The supplementary pension system is based on the principle
that employers and employees have the primary responsibility
for the establishment of pension provisions; there is no
obligation to make a pension provision. However, once an
employer has made a pension commitment to his employees, this
commitment must be implemented according to the conditions
prescribed in the Pension Act, and is also subject to the
protections built into the act. 221 The main safeguard is the rule
that pension commitments must be financed on the basis of
capital funding, and that the reserves must be placed outside the
employer’s company through one of the following: (1) by joining
an industry-wide pension fund; (2) by establishing a companypension fund; or (3) by entering into an agreement with an
insurance provider.222 The safeguard provides protection in case
the company goes bankrupt.223
An agreement between the employer (or employers’
organization) and employees’ organizations defines the portions
of the pension contributions that must be paid by the employer
and the employee (in some cases the employer pays all
contributions). If an employee changes jobs, she or he has the
legal right to transfer his or her pension rights to the fund
affiliated with the new employer.224 As a result, there is no gap
in the pension record.
Although employers are not obligated to make pension
commitments to their employees, the vast majority of
employees—about 90%—are now covered by an occupational
pension scheme.225 The Minister of Social Affairs has the power
to impose mandatory participation in a pension fund within a
given industry at the request of employers’ and employees’

220. See Mies Westerveld, Keuzes van gisteren…eeen blauwdruk voor morgen?:
Honderd jaar socialeverzekeringspensioenen in de Bondsrepubliek Duitsland, GrootBrittannië en Nederland (SDU, 1994).
221. Pensioenwet, Stb. 2006, 705 (Pension Act).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Sibylle J.M. Reichert, The Dutch Pension System: an overview of the key
aspects, 11, 29, DUTCH ASSOCIATION OF INDUSTRY-WIDE PENSION FUNDS, available at
http://www.pensioenfederatie.nl/Document/Publicaties/English%20publications/Nede
rlandse_pensioensysteem_Engelstalige_versie.pdf.
225. See generally Rijksoverheid, ‘Opbouw pensioenstelsel,’ Pensioen,
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/pensioen/opbouw-pensioenstelsel
(last
accessed Apr. 15, 2015); Reichert, supra note 224.
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organizations that have jointly set up a pension fund for that
branch.226
Since the contents of the pensions are defined in
agreements
between
the
employers’
and
employees’
representatives, there are no general rules on the level of
pensions applicable to all schemes. However, the tax rules
define limits for the contributions that can be deducted from
taxes, which is extremely influential on the pension rules that
are made. Most schemes are defined benefit schemes, in which
the employee is promised a pension that is a ratio of the wage
earned during his or her lifetime. However, more recently, due
to the financial crisis and problems with the pension funds, the
pension promise does not mention the exact amount of the
pension anymore.
In the 1990s, pension funds ran into trouble because
pension obligations and costs increased, while fewer
contributions were being paid and capital market interest rates
and returns on investments dropped sharply.227 Consequently,
the reserves of the funds decreased, and their solvency eroded.228
In order to deal with this situation, the then supervisory body
tightened up the regulations for pension funds and intensified
its supervision.229 The funds had to take measures to increase
their reserves.230 One such measure was the shift in most funds
from pensions calculated on the final wage to pensions based on
the average wage earned during the career (although they are
still defined benefit plans).231
226. On the basis of the Wet verplichte deelname bedrijfstakpensioenfonds, Stb.
2000, 628 (Act on compulsory participation in a pension fund).
227. Federation of the Dutch Pension Funds, supra note 213, at 30-31; see Igor
Guardiancich, The Netherlands: current pension system: first assessment of reform
outcomes
and
output,
(OSE,
2010),
available
at
www.ose.be/Filed/publication/2010/country_reports_pension/OSE_2010_CRpension_
TheNetherlands.pdf.
228. See Robbert van het Kaar, Dutch pension funds face serious challenges,
EURWORK),
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2011/01/articles/nl1101039i.htm
(last updated May 2, 2011) (stating “Rising premiums and the option of
supplementary deposit obligations are increasingly prompting employers to make
employees responsible for pension risks, in part or in full”).
229. See Mark den Hollander and Tjitsger Hulshoff, Hogere buffereisen voor
pensioenfondsen
kunnen
knellen,
MEJUDICE
(Dec.
28,
2011),
http://www.mejudice.nl/artikelen/detail/hogere-buffereisen-voor-pensioenfondsenkunnen-knellen; Besluit financieel toetsingskader pensioenfondsen, Stb. 2006, 710.
230. Hollander, supra note 229.
231. Guardiancich, supra note 227. Independent pension experts are already for
a long time in favor of average wage systems. J.C.N. Kennis, Lex Meijdam, & Harrie
Verbon, Van eindloon naar middelloon, 82 (4128) 861-864 (Economisch Statistische
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In July 2014, the government finally came up with a
proposal that allowed pension funds to take more time to acquire
the necessary capital, but the reserves have to be bigger than
what was required before.232 Whether this solution will be
sufficient to shore up the pension system, as well as what effects
it will ultimately have, remains to be seen.233
Defined
contribution plans are sometimes proposed, but there is little
popularity.
B. THE NEW DISABILITY BENEFITS ACT OF 2004
The introductory section discussed how the continuous
increase of new disability benefit claimants was a big problem
for the government.234 Measures like redefining the concept of
disability and amending the level did not change this
situation.235
As a result, a new structural approach was
introduced via the Wet Werk en Inkomen Naar Arbeidsvermogen
(WIA), the new Disability Benefits Act, adopted in 2004.236 This
approach stressed the priority of work over receiving benefits,
and for this purpose, the act introduced several new
instruments.237
In addition, the changes to the Sickness
Benefits Act were seen as vital in reducing the number of new
disability claimants, since the longer people remain ill, the more
likely it is that they will become a disability benefit claimant; we
will discuss the sickness benefits below (under C).
The new Disability Benefits Act makes a distinction
between persons who are permanently disabled to at least 80%
(the permanently fully disabled) and those who are not
permanently disabled, or who are permanently disabled to a
Berichten, 1997), available at http://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/200922/vaniendl,pdf.
232. Legal Alert: New bill to amend financial assessment framework for pension
funds,
DE
BRAUW,
BLACKSTONE,
WESTBROEK
(July
9,
2014),
http://www.debrauw.com/wp-content/uploads/NEWS%20%20LEGAL%20ALERTS/Pensions/2014/New-bill-to-amend-financial-assessmentframework-for-pension-funds.pdf.
233. Wet aanpassing financieel toetsingskader, Stb. 2014, 567 (Act on adjusting
the financial framework for pensions).
234. See infra section III.
235. De wegwijzer naar informatie en diensten van alle overheden, 22.730, 19921993.
236. The
Act
was
preceded
by
the
report
of
Adviescommissie
arbeidsongeschiktheid, Werk maken van arbeidsgeschiktheid (2001) avalaible at
http://docs.szw.nl/pdf/35/2002/35_2002_3_2406.pdf.
237. Barend Barentsen, Arbeidsongeschiktheid: aansprakelijkheid, bescherming
en compensatie (Kluwer, 2003).
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lesser extent than 80% (the partially disabled).238 The
assessment of incapacity of work is done by assessing what a
person can still earn with the remaining capacities in any work
available on the labor market. This (theoretical) income is
compared with the previous income, and thus the level of
incapacity is calculated. Thus, a very broad range of possible
work is taken into account (not only suitable work). As a result,
the system is very strict.
According to the new act, the permanently fully disabled
have the right to a generous disability benefit because measures
for getting them back to work are not considered relevant.239
The level of this benefit is 75% of their previous wage.240
The partially disabled are subject to conditions and rules
meant to reinforce their re-integration back into work.241 In
order to be eligible for disability benefits, they have to be more
than 35% disabled.242 They receive a wage-related benefit if
they satisfy certain conditions relating to their employment
history; the duration of the benefit is contingent on the duration
of their employment history. 243 This benefit is 70% of their
previous wages.244 After the right to this benefit has expired (or
if the claimant is not entitled to this benefit because of an
insufficient work record), a so-called “wage supplement benefit”
is payable, on condition that the claimant actually earns an
income of at least half the residual earning capacity.245 The
latter capacity is calculated by looking at the income the person
can earn with any kind of work that he or she can still do (so not
only their own previous work or suitable work).246 This is a
theoretical assessment, so it is not relevant whether there are
238. The assessment is done by comparing the physical and psychological
deficiencies due to medical reasons and a database of job descriptions (regardless of
whether there are vacancies) with the purpose to determine how much a person can
still earn. The more a person can earn, the lower the disability rate. See more on this
method at Schattingsbesluit arbeidsongeschiktheidswetten, Stb. 2000, 307 (Decree on
Assessment for Disability Acts).
239. These are often called re-integration measures.
240. Up to a ceiling, which is currently 4137 euro a month. The maximum benefit
is 75% of this amount (which is gross income), see Art. 17 WFSV.
241. Art. 29 WIA (The New Disability Act).
242. Art. 54 WIA (The New Disability Act).
243. Art. 59 WIA (The New Disability Act). The rules for entitlement and
duration of this benefit follow those of the Unemployment Benefits Act, which is
discussed in more detail below.
244. See id; see also Art. 81-83 WFSV.
245. Art. 59-101 WIA (The New Disability Act).
246. Art. 59 WIA (The New Disability Act).
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employment vacancies.247 What is relevant is that the claimant
realizes at least half the income she or he can theoretically
earn.248 Until this point, disability schemes did not have a
connection with the actual income a person earns. The resulting
benefit in this case is 70% of the difference between the
individual’s previous earnings and his residual earning
capacity.249 Actual income is received in addition to this.250
Thus, increases in income do not lead to a lower benefit, making
it attractive to work as much as one can. In other words, it is
attractive to work as much as possible, since income is not
deducted from the benefit received.
The claimant who, upon expiration of his or her wagerelated benefit, does not satisfy the condition that he or she
earns at least 50% of the person’s remaining earning capacity is
instead eligible for a low benefit.251 In the case of full disability,
this is 70% of the statutory minimum wage.252 In cases of
partial disability, the benefit depends on the incapacity rate.253
Persons who are incapacitated to a level of less than 35% are not
eligible for a benefit.254 It was the view of the legislature that
their incapacity rate is so low that they should be able to
work.255
Currently, this constitutes a consistent approach,
elaborated upon via new specific rules aimed at reducing
sickness and disability claims. Under this approach, during the
sickness period, employer and employee must do everything
possible for the latter to stay at or return to work. The hope is
that most workers can still do adjusted or other types of work in
a modified workplace, if necessary. If the employee is not able to
earn at least 65% of the previously earned wage after two years,
the disability benefit scheme encourages the beneficiary to keep
247. See id.
248. Thus, if a person is supposed to have an earning capacity of 1,000 euro per
month, he or she must have an income from work of at least 500 euro per month in
order to be eligible for the wage supplement. The idea behind this rule is that it must
be made as attractive as possible for the person concerned to (re)start working or
remain in work. Parliamentary Papers II 2004-2005, 30.034, section 3.1, available at
http://www.overheid.nl (Explanatory Memorandum to The New Disability Benefit
Act).
249. See Art. 59 WIA (The New Disability Act); see also Art. 63 WIA.
250. Art. 52-60 WIA.
251. Art. 61 WIA.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Art. 61:6 WIA (The New Disability Act).
255. See Barentsen, supra note 237.
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working, and/or seek more work, as this leads to a higher
benefit, as has been explained supra. In evaluating reports of
this act, it appears that the number of new entrants for benefits
has been much lower than under the old disability act, although
whether those who are disqualified ultimately find work is not so
clear.256
Employers have the discretion to opt out of the disability
scheme, but are not obligated to do so.257 “Opting out” might not
be an optimal term, since opting out here is limited to no longer
having to pay contributions to the scheme. Therefore, the term
“own risk bearer” is generally used.258 Instead of paying
contributions, the employer bears the financial risks of the
disability benefits (for the partially disabled and nonpermanently disabled - Group B mentioned above) for the first
ten years of disability.259
The decision on granting and
terminating the right to benefits is still in the hands of the
public benefits administration, and the statutory rules for
benefits also apply.260 Since the employer pays the benefit, he or
she has the advantage of paying less social security
contributions.261 After the first ten years of benefit payments to
a beneficiary, the benefits administration bears the
responsibility of the costs for that person.262
Employers may buy private insurance to bear the risk of the
first ten years of benefit payments, and they usually do so.263
These insurance policies are often adjusted to the individual
enterprise concerned, and little is shared with the public about
the conditions, prices, and uses. This also means that the risk
bearers are responsible for reintegration activities of the persons
for whom they bear the risk.264 Thus, they can directly impact
their risk, and if they succeed in getting a person back to work,
they see the benefits of their efforts.

256. See Boukje Cuelenaere, et al., Onderzoek evaluatie WIA (Astri, 2011),
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en
publicaties/rapporten/2011/03/28/onderzoek-evaluatie-wia/onderzoek-evaluatiewia.pdf.
257. Art. 82-87 WIA.
258. See, e.g., id.
259. Art. 82 WIA (The New Disability Act).
260. See Frans Pennings, Kunnen eigenrisicodragers wel hun eigen risico
beinvloeden?, Tijdschrift recht en arbeid, 2014.
261. Art. 40 WFSV.
262. Art. 82 WIA (The New Disability Act).
263. Cuelenaere, supra note 256.
264. Art. 27:6 WIA (The New Disability Act).
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In conclusion, disability benefits give strong financial
incentives for beneficiaries to return to work. Employers are not
directly involved, except when a claim is made, but they can be
involved by deciding to bear their own risk. In that case, the
decisions on benefits are still made by the public benefits
administration.
C. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
The current Unemployment Benefits Act was adopted in
1986.265 It provides claimants who have lost at least five
working hours per week with an unemployment benefit.266 In
other words, claimants do not have to be completely out of work
in order to be considered unemployed.267
In order to satisfy the conditions regarding previous
employment, the claimant must have worked at least one hour a
week as an employee in at least twenty-six of the thirty-six
weeks immediately preceding the first day of unemployment.268
For persons satisfying this condition, the duration of the benefit
is three months.269 If additional conditions are fulfilled, a longer
benefit is paid. These rules are simply put: For each year of
work, the benefit is prolonged for one month.270 The maximum
period for which a benefit can be received is thirty-eight
months.271 However, the law was changed in June 2014, and the
maximum period during which benefits can be received will be
reduced to twenty-four months beginning in 2015, because the
government wants to encourage people to find work, which has
the tangential benefit of reducing expenditures.272
The Act imposes an obligation on the benefit administration
(not merely a discretionary power) to sanction the beneficiary if
she or he did not satisfy his or her obligations as defined under
the law.273 Until this law came into force in 2006, the benefit

265. Werkloosheidswet, Stb. 1986, 567 (Unemployment Benefits Act).
266. Art. 16:1 WW.
267. See generally Pennings, supra note 200.
268. Art. 17 WW (Unemployment Benefits Act).
269. Art. 42:1 WW (Unemployment Benefits Act).
270. Art. 42:2 WW (Unemployment Benefits Act).
271. Id.
272. During the first ten years, one still acquires one month per year; after the
ten years, it is half a month per year. Wet werk en zekerheid, Stb. 2014, 216 (Work
and Security Act),
273. Art. 27 WW (Unemployment Benefits Act).
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administration had discretionary powers to impose a sanction.274
During the first two months, the benefit, in cases of full
unemployment, is 75% of the daily wage.275 After this period,
the level is 70% of the daily wage.276 A person whose benefit is
below the applicable subsistence income277 may be eligible for a
supplement under a subsistence benefit act.278
Unemployment benefits can be reduced or withdrawn if a
person is considered to have become culpably unemployed (i.e.
can be blamed for the situation).279 Grounds for such dismissal
include theft from the employer or violence against the employer
and fellow employees.280 While those are just a few examples,
they are representative of the seriousness of the offenses in
question. In addition, the employee is also considered culpably
unemployed if the employment relationship has ended by, or on
the request of, the employee, whereas continuation of the
employment relationship would not have resulted in such
difficulties for the employee that this continuation could not, in
all fairness, have been demanded of her or him.281 This makes it
clear that if an employee took the initiative to end the
employment relationship without a good reason that person is
culpably unemployed and benefits will be refused completely.
Generally, if the employer took the initiative to terminate the
employment relationship, the employee is able to obtain
benefits.282 This approach was adopted in 2006 so that the
mobility of workers was not blocked.283 Prior to the change,
employees had to fight their dismissal in any case where the
employer took the initiative since such attempt could lead, in
theory, to continuation of the employment contract or
reinstatement of the employee, and then no benefits had to be

274. See generally Frans Pennings and Anita Damsteegt, De Werkloosheidswet
(Kluwer, 2009).
275. Art. 45 WW (Unemployment Benefits Act).
276. See Art. 17 WFSV.
277. Subsistence income is closed related to the amounts mentioned for the old
age benefits in Art. 9 AOW.
278. See Part I, See infra Part III.
279. Art. 27 WW (Unemployment Benefits Act).
280. Art. 24 WW (Unemployment Benefits Act).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Baker
&
McKenzie,
The
Netherlands
361,
available
at
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Supporting%20Your%20Bu
siness/Global%20Markets%20QRGs/Termination,%20Discrimination%20and%20Har
assment/qr_netherlands_terminationdiscriminationharassmentguide_2009.pdf.
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paid.284
If an employee is culpably unemployed, the UWV (the
benefit administration) must refuse any form of unemployment
benefit.285 It is not only in cases of culpable unemployment that
the Werkloosheidswet provides what measures have to be taken.
The same rules apply if the claimant does not prevent becoming
or staying unemployed as a result of neglecting to accept
suitable work, or by failing to obtain or to keep suitable work
through his own fault.286 Suitable work is any work that fits a
given employee’s strengths and skill set, unless acceptance of
that job poses physical, mental, or social demands on that person
that cannot be met.287 If an employee neglects to accept suitable
work or if she or he fails to obtain suitable work through his or
her own fault, the benefit must permanently be refused for the
time period in which the person could have worked, if not for
that person’s refusal to accept the work in question.288 The act
also obligates the claimant to actively apply for work and not
intentionally hinder the possibility of getting such work.289 The
employee is, moreover, required to cooperate in obtaining the
education or training deemed necessary for his or her future
employment, or for other activities that are beneficial to his or
her reintegration.290
D. PROTECTION IN CASE OF SICKNESS
In the area of sickness benefits, a new approach
materialized with the introduction of the statutory obligation for
employers to continue to pay wages when an employee gets sick.
This new approach began in 1994 with the introduction of the
rule that employers had to continue to pay wages during the
first six weeks of illness (for small enterprises, defined by the
law as having fewer than fifteen employees, the period was two
weeks).291 The assumption underlying the new act was that if
employers were responsible for income provision during
sickness, they would check more carefully whether an employee
284. Art. 24 WW; Art. 27 WW.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Art. 27 WW (Unemployment Benefits Act).
289. Art. 24 WW (Unemployment Benefits Act).
290. Art. 26 WW (Unemployment Benefits Act).
291. Wet Terugdringing Ziekteverzium, Stb. 1993, 750 (Sickness Absence
(Reduction) Act).
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was rightfully absent.292 Another anticipated effect of the new
law was that employers would take measures to reduce the risk
of injury or sickness caused by dangerous working conditions.293
The construction sector, in particular, was one in which many
measures could be taken to reduce the number, and drastic
effects, of accidents.294 So even though there was a separate
Health and Safety Act, the new sickness provisions encouraged
additional efforts to prevent accidents and sickness.
Although it is not clear whether the obligation for employers
to pay wages in case of sickness really had the desired effect, two
years later, the employer’s responsibility to pay wages to ill
employees was extended to a period of fifty-two weeks.295 This
extension occurred through a law that amended, inter alia, the
Civil Code in order to give ill employees the legal right to 70% of
their wages for that 52-week period.296 In 2004, the period was
extended to 104 weeks.297 In collective agreements, which cover
90% of the Dutch workforce, the statutory required wage is often
supplemented to cover the full wage.298 This additional coverage
varies from agreement to agreement.299
This process of replacing the right to sickness benefits with
a statutory obligation for employers to pay wages to ill
employees (henceforth “sick pay”) is sometimes called the
privatization of the Sickness Benefits Act, although it is not
actually a privatization.300
Still, the employer is entirely
responsible for the costs, and although the Civil Code provides
strict rules, an employer can adopt supplementary obligations
for the employee, such as the timeframe within which the

292. Babara Hofman & Frans Pennings, Privatisering en activering in de
Nederlandse sociale zekerheid en solidariteit – een international perspectief,
(Deventer, 2013).
293. Id.
294. This could be accomplished with stronger rules such as the enforcement
helmets, enforced shoes and protection barriers for workers at high-level sites.
Additionally, a policy to avoid sickness caused by stress or conflicts at work could
contribute to lower costs.
295. Wet Verlenging loondoorbetaling bij ziekte, Stb. 1996, 142 (Sickness Act).
296. Id.
297. Art. 7:629 BW.
298. See Fase W. et al, Sociale zekerheid: privaat of publiek? (Kluwer, 1994)
(describing the privatization principles that apply to the Sickness Benefit Act).
299. Because of these variations, it is difficult to say how many workers were
thus guaranteed 100% of their former wage.
300. For a description of the various dimensions of the privatization of the social
security benefit, see Becker, U. and Pennings, F., International Standard-Setting and
Innovations in Social Security, Wolters Kluwer, 2013), p. 381.
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employee has to contact the employer when he or she is ill.301
However, these rules must fit within the framework of the
statutory obligations, and can be challenged in court, as it is
part of labor law.
Employers can buy private insurance to cover their risk, but
they are not obligated to do so. In an effort to make adoption of
the act easier, and to get access to this large market, the
association of insurance companies decided that the companies
would make no assessment of employees’ health conditions when
an employer took out insurance (this insurance covered all
employees, so an employer could not choose who to insure).302
Previously, when employers only had to pay benefits for six
weeks, they often shouldered the responsibility themselves, but
when the fifty-two-week period was introduced, they more
frequently bought insurance.303 However, even in the insurance
coverage context, there is still often a risk period borne by the
employer, (e.g., for the first six weeks, or when the absence for
leave is for longer than a certain period (“stop loss
insurance”)).304
To this day, the Sickness Benefit Act has not been abolished
and still applies to those who do not currently, or no longer, have
an employer. Flexible workers are an example of those who do
not currently have an employer, while those who no longer have
an employer are the unemployed.305 For them, the act serves as
a safety net. Since the new rules can have the potentially
adverse effect of employers being unwilling to employ high-risk
persons, the Act on Medical Examinations was introduced in

301. See Art. 7:629 BW (Civil Code).
302. Sociaal Economische Raad, Advies kabinetsvoornemens ZW, AWW en WAO,
267
(April
1995,
SER
95/05),
http://www.ser.nl/~/media/db_adviezen/1990_1999/1995/b13146.ashx).
303. See Theo Veerman and Jan Besseling, Prikkels en privatisering, (Elsevier,
2001), p. 27. (describing the system of incentives created by privatization).
304. Similarly, stop-loss insurance is commonly utilized in the United States to
allow smaller employers to self-fund their health insurance plans and thereby,
through ERISA preemption, avoid state insurance regulation. See MEDILL, supra
note 154, at 330 (“Stop-loss insurance policies provide that the stop-loss insurer will
pay for claims made by participants in the selfinsured plan that exceed a specified
dollar amount. This dollar amount is known as the policy’s attachment point.”)
(emphasis in original).
305. Unemployed persons are also covered for sickness, even though that may
not lead to a different income, since they may be disqualified for unemployment
benefit during sickness. In addition, for persons suffering from long-term sickness
and unable to return to work, these persons may qualify for disability benefits. These
benefits are financed by contributions paid to the sickness and disability funds.
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1997. The Act prohibits medical examinations as a standard
practice, only allowing them if the job had specific health
requirements (e.g. pilots).306 The purpose of this Act is to reduce
the risk that chronically ill persons would never be able to find
employment.
In addition to this change in benefit rules, the Law on
Conditions at the Workplace was amended in order to introduce
more stringent obligations on the part of employers to improve
working conditions.307 Better working conditions were meant to
reduce the number of accidents. In addition, the employer had
to develop a policy with the aim of reducing sickness in the
workplace.308 To this end, employers are obligated to make an
analysis of all situations that could potentially endanger the
health and safety of their employees.309
The mere employer obligation to continue to pay the wages
of his or her ill employees did not, in the view of the government,
result in sufficient reintegration efforts by employers.310 One
reason was that private insurance offset the financial burdens of
the employer’s obligation to pay wages. Another reason was that
employers sometimes considered undertaking reintegration
measures more expensive or burdensome than having to
continue to pay an ill employee’s wages. This led to the Wet
Verbetering Poortwachter (Gatekeepers Act).311
The Gatekeepers Act’s purpose was to narrow access to the
Disability Benefits Act.312 This act requires employers and ill
employees to undertake reintegration efforts if illness is
expected to last for a long period (of course, in most cases of
illness, such as colds, no measures are necessary).313 Thus, if an
306. See de E.L. Vos, et. al., Evaluatie wet op de medische keuringen Zon, (Den
Haag, 2001); see c.f., Netherlands Committee of Jurists for Human Rights, Medical
Data of Dutch Patients Exchanged Without Consent, EUROPEAN LIBERTIES
PLATFORM,
http://www.liberties.eu/en/news/exchange-of-medical-data-netherlands
(pointing out protective measures concerning medical privacy in the Netherlands
that equate to HIPAA laws in the United States) (Nov. 10, 2014).
307. Art. 7:685 BW (Civil Code).
308. Arbeidsomstandighedenwet, Stb. 1999, 184 (Health and Safety Act).
309. Art. 5 Arbeidsomstandighedenwet Stb. 1999, 184.
310. Parliamentary Papers II 2000-2001, 27.678, nr. 3, (Explanatory
Memorandum to Wet Verbetering poortwachter,).
311. Wet verbetering poortwachter, Stb. 2001, 628.
312. See Besluit SUWI, Stb. 2001, 688; see also FAQs Gatekeeper, DELFT
UNIVERSITY OF TECH., https://intranet.tudelft.nl/en/health-and-well-being/illnessand-recovery/disability/gatekeeper-improvement-act/faqs/ (last accessed Apr. 30,
2015.
313. Art. 7:658a BW
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employee is expected to be ill for more than six weeks, the
employee and the employer are required to make a reintegration
plan.314 The plan can entail, for instance, that the employee’s
work area be adjusted to meet his or her impairments, and/or
training the employee to get him or her experience in another job
within the organization.
Subsequently, the employer and
employee have to meet on a regular basis to see how the
reintegration efforts are progressing, and make adjustments to
the plan if necessary.315 Each party can also require the other to
cooperate; and if necessary, cooperation can also be enforced
through legal means.316
Three months before an employee applies for a disability
benefit, the UWV (benefit administration) assesses whether the
reintegration activities have been sufficient.317 For this purpose,
the employee has to produce a report on the reintegration
activities undertaken.318 If the employer’s actions are considered
insufficient by UWV, it extends the employer’s obligation to pay
wages for a maximum of twelve months. 319 So, in total, the
employer may have to pay wages for three years. Conversely, if
the employee has not cooperated satisfactorily, she or he can be
refused a disability benefit for a certain period, which is
regulated in the present Disability Benefits Act.320
In assessing the effectiveness of this scheme, only a few
problems have been reported related to sick pay by employers. In
addition, strict labor and dismissal laws minimize the ability of
employers to escape the obligation to pay.
This is the
previously-mentioned Act concerning medical assessment that
was meant to reduce risk selection. Another example is the
dismissal law, which includes, a rule that a person who is ill can,
in principle, not be given notice (dismissed) during the first two
years of sickness.321 Still, employers can try to reduce their risks

314. See Regeling procesgang eerste en tweede ziektejaar, Stcrt. 2002, no. 60.
315. Id.
316. See Art. 658a BW (A similar mechanism exists under the reasonable
accommodation provisions of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA)); See
generally EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue
Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, (Oct. 17, 2002), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html#N_20.
317. Art. 6 AOW.
318. Id.
319. See Art. 7:629(11) BW (Civil Code).
320. Art. 30 Wet werk en inkomen naar arbeidsvermogen, Stb. 2005, 572 (The
New Disability Act).
321. See Art. 7:670 BW (Civil Code).
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by carefully selecting employees and dismissing persons who are
often ill, as long as the dismissal is given during a period when
the person is not ill. To what extent this happens is difficult to
say, as it is hard to prove that in a particular situation the
treatment was grounded on disability. However, such behavior
would amount to discrimination, which is forbidden by
provisions limiting that type of discrimination.322
Employers facing the risk of having to continue to pay
wages to sick employees often offer contracts for a definite
period, since the obligation to pay sick pay ends as soon as the
contract expires; after all, it is a continuation of payment of
wages, so for this purpose the existence of a labor contract is
essential. Alternatively, employers make use of agencies for
temporary work; in such cases, the worker is not employed by
them and thus they do not have to pay sick pay benefits and the
agency can end the employment relationship on the first day of
sickness.323
As a result of the Gatekeepers Act, larger firms especially
developed comprehensive policies for sick employees that
enabled the firm to utilize them in other areas of the
enterprise.324 Still, many of these employers are obligated by
the benefits administration to pay an extended period of sick pay
after the first two years, since they were considered to have
undertaken insufficient activities to reintegrate a sick
employee.325
Generally, this new system strongly encourages sick
employees and their employers to undertake reintegration
efforts, and the sanctions in failing to do so are quite severe in
cases of negligence; as we have seen the sanction is that the
employer has to continue to pay wage for another period of
(maximum) twelve months. Since the success of reintegration is
highest when an employee is still employed by his or her
employer (which is the case during the first two years of
322. Wet gelijke behandeling op grond van handicap of chronische ziekte, Stb.
2003, 206 (Act on equal treatment on ground of disability or chronical disease).
323. A new law since 2014 requires employers, whose former employees become
ill or disabled, to pay a contribution based on the costs of the benefits for these
employees. This was introduced to make it less attractive to make use of flexible
workers. See Parliamentary Papers II 2011-2012, no. 33.241, 3 (referencing Wet
beperking ziekteverzuim en arbeidsongeschiktheid vangnetters (Act to restrict sick
leave and disability of persons in the Sickness Benefits Act)).
324. See Femke Reijenga, et al., Evaluatie wet verbetering poortwachter, (Astri,
2006).
325. See id.
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sickness, when labor law prohibits, in principal, dismissal of the
ill employee), this form of “activation” has become a cornerstone
of present day Dutch social security policy.326
In Part II of this article, we discussed, as part of sickness
benefits, family benefits: benefits that allow one to care for a sick
family member.327 Such benefits are not part of the Dutch Sick
Pay or Sickness Benefit Act; instead the employer has to
continue to pay wages, as in case of short-term leave, for this
purpose, or the employer has to grant unpaid leave.328 For
pregnancy and maternity leave, there is a special benefit (at the
rate of 100% of the previous wage, during sixteen weeks).329
E. HEALTHCARE BENEFITS SCHEME
Until 2006, the healthcare system was a dual system where
the compulsory Law on Health Care covered employees if they
earned a wage below a certain level, while others could buy
voluntary insurance.330 This dual system was criticized because
of the differences between the two parts, often resulting in more
generous conditions for private insurance, and a lack of
compulsory insurance for everybody.331 The Care Insurance Act
replaced the old system in 2005,332 which now requires all
Netherlands residents to take out private healthcare
insurance.333
The main reason for implementing the new act was that
new mechanisms were deemed necessary to reassert control over
healthcare expenses.334 The costs for medical care had been
rising for several years due to the aging population and rapid
medical-technological developments.335 These trends resulted in
new and expensive tools, machines, and treatment methods, and

326. See Becker, supra note 300, at 443-56 (noting that committees supervising
international instruments—like ILO convention 121 and the European Social
Charter—have been very critical of this paradigm shift from general solidarity to the
individual responsibility of the employer).
327. In Western European systems the term “family benefits” refers to benefits
paid for the maintenance of children.
328. See Wet Arbeid en Zorg, Stb. 2001, 567.
329. Id.
330. Ziekenfondswet, Stb. 1964, 392 (Healthcare Act).
331. Hofman, supra note 292.
332. Zorgverzekeringswet, Stb. 2005, 358 (Care Insurance Act).
333. Id.
334. See Parliamentary Papers II 2003-2004, no. 29763.3, 2.
335. Id.
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the costs were expected to grow even further.336
Economic approaches have become very influential in Dutch
healthcare. The main idea behind the new act was to have a
system of controlled competition between insurance companies,
signaling a massive shift from the old healthcare act, which was
much more centrally regulated by the state.337
The objective of the new act is to ensure that insurance
companies, care providers, and the insured are encouraged to
organize and make use of healthcare more efficiently.338 For this
purpose, the act mandates that each resident choose a care
insurance company from which to buy insurance.339 This leads
to competition between insurance companies, with the hope that
insurance companies will focus more on the preferences of the
insured. At the same time, people will hopefully make more
efficient arrangements when buying insurance from providers,
since otherwise the contributions for which they have to pay will
be too high (or the losses will become too great).340 In addition to
competition, the act also contains important solidarity elements:
since all residents are compulsorily insured, insurance
companies have to provide all applicants with insurance under
the same conditions, regardless of their personal characteristics
and situations.341 The act also guarantees that an insurance
company can only ask for the same contribution from its insured
for basic insurance coverage (i.e. the insurance regulated by the
act), so it cannot differentiate between risks.342 The act defines
the elements of basic insurance, such as what care is available
and under what conditions.343 Examples include medical care by
general practitioners, medical specialists and midwives; hospital
stays; medicines; specialist mental healthcare, including
treatment by a psychiatrist; basic mental healthcare, including
primary care psychologists and an internet treatment process;
tools for treatment, care, rehabilitation, nursing, or a specific
limitation; physiotherapy for persons up to eighteen years old;
limited physical therapy and exercise therapy after the 21st
treatment for certain chronic diseases; pelvic physiotherapy for

336. .Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Zorgverzekeringswet, Stb. 2005, 358 (Care Insurance Act).
340. See Parliamentary Papers II, 2003/2004, 29763.
341. Zorgverzekeringswet Stb. 2005, 358. (Care Insurance Act).
342. Zorgverzekeringswet Stb. 2005, 358 (Care Insurance Act).
343. Zorgverzekeringswet Stb. 2005, 358 (Care Insurance Act).
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urinary incontinence up to the ninth treatment; speech therapy
and occupational therapy; dental care (control and treatment)
for children up to eighteen years old; dental surgical care and
dentures; patient transport; maternity care; up to three hours of
treatment for dietary advice; fee of three IVF treatments;
dyslexia care; and a stop-smoking program. 344
Insurance companies have choices in how they implement
the health insurance act for the insured. For instance, they can
decide whether the costs get reimbursed or care providers get
paid directly by the company, as well as whether they reduce
contributions if the insured bears the risk of the costs (in
addition to the statutory defined own risk).345 In this way, they
can compete with other companies, and are also allowed to profit
from their insurance schemes.346
Strictly speaking though, under the act there are no longer
“insured persons;” instead people have the obligation to buy
insurance.347 If a person does not buy such insurance, that
person is simply not insured. In addition, in the case of noninsurance or no coverage, a fine can be imposed.348
Persons under eighteen years of age do not have to pay
contributions, and persons on a low income can receive a
compensation, paid by the Tax Office, for paying the
contribution.349 Insurance coverage starts on the day on which
the company receives an insurance application, and the
insurance can even have retroactive effect up to four months
after the obligation to be insured arises.350 The purpose of this
provision is to ensure the comprehensiveness of the system, so
there is continuous coverage for those who are slow in making a
choice or for those who change companies at the end of the
calendar year.351 This is atypical for insurance because, in
general, “burning houses are no longer insured.”352
344. See
Rijksoverheid,
Health
Insurance,
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/zorgverzekering/vraag-en-antwoord/watzit-er-in-het-basispakket-van-de-zorgverzekering.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
345. Parliamentary Papers II 2003-2004, no. 29.763.
346. Parliamentary Papers II 2003-2004, no. 29.763.
347. Zorgverzekeringswet, Stb. 2014, 494 (Care Insurance Act).
348. The fine is $410. After a second fine of the same amount, the insurance is
bought by the public insurances and the contribution is deducted from the income of
the person concerned (most often a benefit).
349. Zorgverzekeringswet, Stb. 2011, 111 (Care Insurance Act).
350. Art. 5 Zorgverzekeringswet, Stb. 2006, 629 (Care Insurance Act).
351. Parliamentary Papers II 2003-2004, no. 29.763.
352. Id.
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An insured person is allowed to give notice of termination
for the insurance contract to the insurance company each
year.353 The idea is that it gives people the freedom to make
their own insurance decisions each year, giving them the
flexibility to choose. In the case of a carrier change, the new
company must accept all applications, regardless of the “risk
profile” of the applicant.354
In addition to the statutory insurance offerings, healthcare
companies can offer supplementary insurance to cover services
not included in the basic plans. These supplementary plans are
not compulsory for the patients, but they are attractive for the
companies because they are often much more profitable than the
statutory insurance. Furthermore, insurance companies can
refuse applicants for supplementary insurance since these are
private insurance schemes, which are not governed by the
Zorgverzekeringswet, but fall under insurance law. They can
also slightly force the hand of insurance applicants because
many insurance companies require that a person purchase the
basic insurance from the company before being allowed to select
the supplementary insurance.355
The contribution of insurance contracts vary per insurance
company (and companies may offer a choice of contracts), but the
contribution is the same for all those who have bought the same
insurance.356 This means that no differences are allowed, e.g.,
for risk level or for age. It follows from this, however, that
contribution rates may vary from company to company.
The contribution is a flat-rate one, so it does not depend on
income.357 Claimants have to bear part of the healthcare costs
per year themselves (435 dollars a year).358 If one opts to bear an
additional share of the costs (up to 622 dollars a year),
contributions are lower.
Some insurance companies provide for a so-called collective
contract for groups such as members of a football club, trade
union, an association of patients, or employees of a particular

353. Art. 7 Zorgverzekeringswet, Stb. 2008, 271 (Care Insurance Act).
354. Parliamentary Papers II 2003/2004, 29.763.
355. Margreet
Reitsma-van
Rooijen,
Aanvullende
zorgverzekering
zonderbasisverzekering niet altijd mogelijk, NIVEL (Dec. 12, 2012), available at
http://www.nivel.nl/nieuws/aanvullende-zorgverzekering-zonder-basisverzekeringniet-altijd-mogelijk-3.
356. Art. 17 Zvw (Care Insurance Act).
357. Art. 16 Zvw (Care Insurance Act).
358. Art. 19 Zvw (Care Insurance Act).
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enterprise; there is no limit to the type of group with which an
insurance company can make an agreement.359 On the basis of
the contract, reductions to the contribution can be offered to the
members of the collective contract, up to a 10% maximum.360
In addition, employers pay a wage-related contribution to a
risk equalization fund.361 This fund compensates an insurance
company if it insures persons of higher-than-average risk.362
This was put into place to minimize the possibility that
particular insurance companies would try to discourage persons
of high risk, such as the chronically ill, from buying insurance.
363
However, it appears as though this does not sufficiently
encourage insurance companies to buy care efficiently, since
they are compensated anyway.364 For this reason, in the future,
the equalization will take place ex ante only; meaning on the
basis of specified characteristics of the clients.365
Healthcare coverage is defined by statutory rules,366 but, as
we have seen, private organizations (insurance companies)
administer the health benefits. Thus, this system maintains a
tight balance between solidarity and room for making a profit.
The main goal of this structure was to introduce efficiencies into
the system (with market instruments) and still realize a
sufficient and affordable system for all residents.
IV.

COMPARISON OF THE DUTCH AND AMERICAN
SOCIAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS

At first blush, the American and Dutch social protection
systems seem quite different, but the picture changes if we do
not limit ourselves to statutory benefits and also take into
account benefits provided by employers (whether or not such
arrangements involve collective bargaining agreements).
In order to address the issue posed in the first section, we
will compare the systems in terms of the levels of protection that
are ensured. In Part A, we will describe, for each of the risks

359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
detail).
365.
366.

Art. 18 Zvw (Care Insurance Act).
Art. 18 Zvw (Care Insurance Act).
Art. 42 Zvw (Care Insurance Act).
Art. 39 Zvw (Care Insurance Act).
Parliamentary Papers II 2003/2004, 29.763.
See Hofman and Pennings, supra n. 292 (describing the system in more
Id.
See, e.g., Zorgverzekeringswet, Stb. 2006, 660 (Care Insurance Act).
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selected in this contribution, the levels of protection that are
ensured. We will then compare the distribution of
responsibilities over the public and non-public actors. We will
also mention the effects in the countries of the approach chosen.
In Part B, we will then describe the policy options following from
this analysis.
A. THE LEVELS OF PROTECTIONS ENSURED AND THE
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES
1. Old Age and Survivors
As an initial point with regard to old age and survivor
benefits, the greying of the population is a common phenomenon,
including the rising of pension age, in both the United States
and the Netherlands.367 Additional comparisons are divided
between pensions defined by laws and occupational pensions.
a. Pensions Whose Contents are Defined by National
Law
Both in the United States and the Netherlands, old-age and
survivor benefits are governed by statutory rules, and the
systems are also similar to the extent that the statutory
protection provides for only a relatively low income replacement
ratio. In the United States, Social Security only replaces about
40% to 50% of the previous wage;368 in the Netherlands, the
benefit is flat-rate ($1367 for a single person, $1888 for a couple
per month).369 This means that pensioners who previously
earned a low income (e.g., the minimum wage) receive a
relatively high replacement rate, while higher income
individuals receive a lower income replacement rate. Based on
2012 figures, this means that for those Dutch workers earning
the average income of about $61,200, the replacement ratio is
about 27% of the average earnings of an individual, much less

367. See e.g., Leen Pressman, Dutch retirement age increase to reduce pensioners
by half million, INVESTMENT & PENSIONS EUROPE (July 18, 2012),
http://www.ipe.com/dutch-retirement-age-increase-to-reduce-pensioners-by-halfmillion/46614.fullarticle (“The Dutch government's recent decision to raise the
official retirement age from 65 to 67 in 2023 will reduce the number of pensioners by
half a million by 2025, according to Statistics Netherlands (CBS)”).
368. See Aon Consulting, supra note 54.
369. See infra Section III.
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than even the American replacement rate.370
b. Occupational (Employer-Sponsored or UnionSponsored) Retirement Plans
Because pension benefits regulated by laws are generally
low in both the United States and the Netherlands, there are
also employer-based (in the Netherlands) and employer—and
union-based—supplementary schemes (in the United States). In
the United States, these types of benefits are voluntary;371 in the
Netherlands, pension plans are also voluntary, but plans made
between employers and unions in a sector can be declared legally
binding by the minister on their request.372
Although both countries promote occupational pensions by
means of tax subsidies or deductions from tax, the Dutch
government has, over time, had a more active policy to
encourage employers to offer these types of pensions, and the
fact that industry-wide pension agreements are legally binding
is an important element to extending the coverage of pension
schemes. However, since the costs of the pension tax subsidies
have been increasing, the Dutch tax rules have been amended,
and thus the Dutch legislature has indirectly had a very large
impact on the contents of these schemes.373 For instance, the
government determines such matters as the starting age for
receiving a pension, the benefit paid by the pension, and the
conditions under which pensions may be maintained.374 Only if
the schemes meet these legal standards are pension
contributions considered tax deductible.375 Still, at the end of
the day, it is the responsibility of the fund to have sufficient
reserves for being able to meet the promised pensions, and in
case of a deficit, the government does not provide

370. OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2013: OECD and G20 Indicators: OECD
PUBLISHING, http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/finance-andinvestment/pensions-at-a-glance-2013/key-indicators-netherlands_pension_glance2013-table162-en#page1 (last updated Oct. 16, 2013).
371. See Scott Mayland, Note, Ratcheting Up the Duty: The Department of
Labor’s Misguided Attempt to Impose a Paternalistic Model Upon Defined
Contribution Plans Through ERISA, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 645, 649 (2014) (explaining
how ERISA does not require employers to establish pension plans for their
employees, but does regulate plans that are established).
372. See infra III(2)(a).
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
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compensation.376
In both countries, tax deductibility of occupational pensions
plays a large role. Although this type of tax incentive may be
seen as an alternative to making a scheme compulsory, the
problem remains that persons who are not offered such
occupational pensions still have to, in a sense, contribute to
those covered by occupational pensions, since they have to pay
more taxes to help make up for the lost tax revenue.
Traditionally, in the Netherlands, occupational pensions
were expected to realize a pension (including the AOW pension)
of 70% of the last earned wages after forty years, although this
was not often reached.377 This changed to 70% of the average
lifetime income, and since the economic crisis of 2008, funds
have made clear that they cannot make promises for a specific
pension anymore.378 In 2008, 49% of the households had an
income replacement rate below 70% of the total average
income.379
One important difference between the Dutch and the
American systems is the growing American reliance on
participant-directed 401(k) defined contribution plans, with or
without employer contributions.380 It does not appear that such
salary deferral plans have had the same impact in the
Netherlands.381 Another difference is that Netherlands pension
laws mandate that workers’ 401(k)-type plans be changed into
lifetime annuities to “ensure they do not spend down all their

376. Id.
377. Id.
378. See Art. 9 AOW.
379. Marike Knoef et al., Measuring Retirement Savings Adequacy; developing a
multi-pillar approach in the Netherlands, J. OF PENSIONS AND ECON. FIN., available
at http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/mk-2014-04.pdf (last visited on May 4, 2015).
380. See PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN: ABSTRACT OF 2012 FORM 5500
ANNUAL REPORTS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
p.
1
(Oct.
2014),
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2012pensionplanbulletin.pdf (highlighting that when
401(k)-type plans were brought into existence in 1978, participants contributed just
29% of the total for all defined contribution plans, but that number rose to about 60%
in 1999, where it remains now). Recent data reiterates that trend—401(k)
participation increased from 513,000 to 516,000 in 2012. Id.
381. See Fieke van der Lecq & Adri van de Wurff, The Price of Pension Risk, 13.3
Journal
of
Risk
83,
92
(2011),
http://people.few.eur.nl/vanderlecq/Publications/The%20price%20of%20pension%20ri
sks.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2014) (“The simulations show that DC schemes have
disadvantages for participants, because participants bear a high investment risk in
such schemes”).
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savings before they turn 75 or 80.”382 That is in stark contrast to
the growing trend of Americans who withdraw large sums from
their 401(k)’s before retirement, though there has been recent
efforts by the U.S. Department of Labor to increase lifetime
income options in the 401(k) context.383 One more important
distinction is that in the Netherlands, if a pension fund cannot
finance its long-term pension obligations, in a move to keep the
fund from crumbling, the central bank (De Nederlandsche Bank)
can mandate that the fund pay reduced benefits for both current
and future retirees.384 On the other hand, United States law
does not permit companies to reduce accrued benefits under
ERISA’s anti-cutback rule.385
If a defined benefit plan
(traditional pension) becomes sufficiently underfunded, the
employer or PBGC can terminate the plan and the participants
will be insured under a federal pension insurance scheme.386 In
such instances, pensioners will receive less than the initially
promised benefit.387
There are also real differences in the particular role played
by occupational pensions in the Dutch and American schemes.
Although both countries place heavy reliance on occupational
pensions as part of overall retirement security, in the
Netherlands, the major part has been made compulsory by the
government based on the request by employers’ organizations
and trade unions that adopted such pension plans.388 Thus,
sector-wide or company pension plans exist in the Netherlands,
whereas “multiemployer plans” or “multiple employer plans” are
less utilized, though not completely absent, from the American
landscape.389 A disadvantage of the compulsory system is that
382. See Steven Greenhouse, How They Do It Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES (May 14,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/15/business/retirementspecial/internationalretirement-plans-offer-insight-to-aid-americassystem.html.
383. See id.
384. See generally DENEDERLANDSCHEBANK, DNB rondt beoordeling evaluatie
herstelplannen,
DNB,
http://www.dnb.nl/nieuws/nieuwsoverzicht-enarchief/persberichten-2014/dnb307075.jsp (last visited May 4, 2015).
385. See 29 U.S.C. §1054(g) (2012).
386. Daniel Keating, Chapter 11’s New Ten-Ton Monster: the PBGC and
Bankruptcy, 77 MINN. L. REV. 803, 806–07 (1993).
387. See id. at 807.
388. See
The
Netherlands,
PENSION
FUNDS
ONLINE,
http://www.pensionfundsonline.co.uk/content/country-profiles/the-netherlands/96
(last visited May 4, 2015) (citing that many industry pension schemes direct people
toward “compulsory membership,” which the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Employment can approve upon request).
389. Harriet Weinstein & William J. Wiatrowski, Multiemployer Pension Plans,
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individuals have no choice whether to participate in occupational
pension plans, and might be better off in investing their
retirement funds in individual retirement accounts outside of
their employer.390 On the other hand, an advantage is that from
this system of high compulsory coverage it follows that the
number of employees without an occupational pension is very
low.
Finally, the predicament of non-employees is unique, but
the two countries do not seem to differ much from the
perspective on how such social protection schemes protect the
unemployed when it comes to retirement income, health
coverage, and the like.
B. DISABILITY BENEFITS
1. Disability Schemes Defined in Legislation
With disability benefits, the differences between the United
States and the Netherlands are more significant than in old-age
schemes. In the United States, disability benefits are provided
at a minimum level by the federal government through Social
Security, although disability is also provided under a few state
insurance programs and through employer-sponsored plans.391
The general level varies widely by state depending on work
history and nature of disability. In the Netherlands, the benefits
are more generous (up to 75% of $5214/month), but only in case
of the fully and permanently disabled.392 Probably because of
COMPENSATION AND WORKING CONDITIONS 19, 21, 23 (Spring 1999)
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/multiemployer-pension-plans.pdf;
See
Lauren
Foster, Should Retirement Savings Be Mandatory? (Forum), ENTERPRISING INVESTOR
(Oct. 8, 2013), http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2013/10/08/should-retirementsavings-be-mandatory-forum-2/ (questioning if it would make sense for the United
States to try out more mandatory retirements savings programs).
390. See Scott Holsopple, How to Take Control of Your 401(k), U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT (Aug. 27, 2013), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/the-smartermutual-fund-investor/2013/08/27/how-to-take-control-of-your-401k (last visited May
4, 2015) (talking about the flexibility that a 401(k) offers and how people are able to
take charge of their plans and make their own investment decisions).
391. See Hinden, supra note 66 (describing the federal government’s involvement
in disability payments via Social Security); See also Ebeling, supra note 74 (noting
employer involvement in disability plans); See also State Short-term Disability
Benefits, NOLO.COM, (Mar. 22, 2015, 2:35 PM), http://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/state-short-term-disability-benefits.
392. See Swiss Life Network, Netherlands: Employee Benefits Reference Manual,
SWISSLIFE,
https://www.swisslife.com/content/dam/id_corporateclients/downloads/ebrm/Netherla
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the relatively high benefits, the Dutch scheme needs many more
policy measures to regulate the influx and outflow of
beneficiaries than the equivalent U.S. scheme. However, the
Social Security disability scheme in the United States (SSDI) is
highly regulated, partially because the system is in financial
distress and there is a need to cut back on awarding benefits as
generously as they were in the past. So we think the Dutch and
American systems are more similar in this regard than it might
first appear to most people.
In the United States, the disability benefit system involves
the cooperation of federal and state schemes, supplemented by
employers’ schemes.
As discussed above, these combined
benefits are still quite low. That also explains the difference
between the U.S. and the Netherlands with regard to the
conditions under which such benefits are awarded. The Dutch
requirements are very strict, supplying disability benefits only
for that part of the income loss that is due to medical reasons.393
So if a person is (in theory) able to do other work, she or he is not
awarded disability benefits to the extent of the income that can
be received from that other work, thus providing not much
protection to those with reduced health who are still able to do
some work. Although there are also positive aspects to this
approach—e.g., being part of the labor market supports the
integration of persons into society—the problem remains that it
is often difficult to find work if you are disabled, both because of
employer prejudices and not having the necessary ability to
perform certain forms of work.
Compared to the Dutch disability eligibility rules, the
United States’ rules are much more loosely defined.
For
instance, the impairments must be severe enough (i.e., last for at
least one year), to keep the person from carrying on in the
regular job or any other type of work.394 There is also a
considerable amount of time that it takes before eligible
individuals are able to receive their disability Social Security
benefits through the system.395
nds.pdf (last visited May 4, 2015) (providing that permanently/fully disabled people
get 75% of their last full daily wage that is “maximized to a salary ceiling”).
393. See infra III(b).
394. Hinden, supra note 66 (explaining how SSDI is a benefit that people can
become eligible for if they have impairments that are severe enough to keep them
from engaging in normal occupations at their place of work or any place of work).
395. See id. (explaining how it might be a longer process for one to begin to
receive benefits if they do not have one of the serious medical conditions named on
Social Security’s Compassionate Allowance List).
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2. Employer-Sponsored Benefits
Because federal and state government disability benefits
are generally low, a number of employers have sought to provide
additional disability benefits through short-term and long-term
disability policies.396 One of the biggest issues is that many
employers—especially smaller employers—do not provide such
coverage.397
Even if an employee is covered by such an
employer-sponsored policy, eligibility can be sometimes difficult
to establish. This is because of two main reasons. First, many
disabled workers pursue their social security disability claim
first, and then only pursue their long-term disability claim
under their employer policy once their eligibility for federal
benefits has been determined. Although the determination of
disability for Social Security purposes will certainly help longterm disability claims, if too much time passes before long-term
disability benefits are sought, the employee may have forfeited
the right to receive under the applicable statute of limitations in
the plan document.
Second, plan administrators strictly
construe eligibility requirements, and it is not unusual for such
claims to be denied for finding lack of disability based on the
submitted medical evidence.
Because of the level of disability benefits in the
Netherlands, there is no general need to supplement the benefit
defined in the WIA, although it sometimes happens. In some
situations, collective agreements apply a more generous
definition of disability so that the worker receives a higher
benefit. Generally, however, it can be said that employers
support the general approach of getting persons back to, or into,
work, and the purpose of the government disability benefit rules
are not undermined. Instead, the collective agreements support
the “activating” element by, for example, providing that in some
sectors, collective agreement employees who are disabled receive
additional protections (e.g., more than 35% cannot be dismissed).
Disabled workers’ employers must find suitable work for them.
This being said, there is still a substantial challenge to meet in
helping disabled workers find jobs in the first place.

396. 2013 Employee Benefits, supra note 65, at 12 (demonstrating the percentage
of employers surveyed in 2013 who offer either long-term or short-term disability
insurance to their employees).
397. Michelle Andrews, Employers Increasingly Trimming or Cutting Disability
Benefits,
KAISER
HEALTH
NEWS
(Sept.
20,
2011),
http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/michelle-andrews-on-disability-coverage/.
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C. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
There are also significant differences in the unemployment
insurance programs in the two countries. While both countries
have primarily a public/government-run system, the American
system is decentralized throughout individual states, whereas
the Dutch system is a uniform national one. Additionally,
whereas the Dutch system uses more private actors, the
American system only uses private actors marginally in running
their system.
For the U.S., every state has a separate unemployment
insurance program, but federal law establishes the rules not
only on benefit funding based on an employer tax (only three
states have employee contributions play a role), but also
provides the general set of standards state unemployment
compensation systems must follow to merit favorable tax
treatment under federal tax law.398 The typical length that
someone can receive benefits is around twenty-six weeks, with
extensions provided during times of extremely heavy
unemployment.399 Furthermore, people only receive, on average,
between 25% and 40% of their previously earned wage.400
Employees can be disqualified from eligibility if they do not look
for new work, voluntarily quit, or are discharged for “willful”
misconduct.401
By comparison, in the Netherlands, the UWV handles the
unemployment scheme (on a national basis). The Unemployment
Benefits Act provides the applicable rules. Consequently, there
are no variations in the legal position of beneficiaries in relation
to the region where they live or the sector in which they work.
The level of benefit is also the same for everyone, i.e., 75% in the
first two months and then 70%. Additionally, a minimum
income is guaranteed by a subsistence benefit.
Neither employers nor trade unions play a role in the
398. See State Unemployment Insurance Benefits, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR EMP. &
TRAINING ADMIN., http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uifactsheet.asp (last
updated May 23, 2013).
399. Id.
400. See Douglas McIntyre, The 10 Best States for Unemployment Benefits – and
the
10
Worst,
DAILY
FINANCE,
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/05/12/unemployment-benefits-best-worst-states/
(last updated May 13, 2011), (providing slightly dated figures, but nonetheless
indicative of the typical unemployment benefits across the country).
401. See Maranville, supra note 98, at 304; see also Schuckers & Bradley, supra
note 99, at 42.
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administration of the U.S. or Dutch unemployment
compensation systems, and in both countries, the law has to be
changed before such a role is possible (if desirable). For both
countries, involving trade unions in the administration of the
scheme in order to make membership more attractive does not
fit into the political and cultural traditions. In the Netherlands,
it is currently being investigated whether the joint participation
of employers and employees in the administration of benefits
would be useful in helping unemployed workers or those
threatened by unemployment, or workers who are not capable to
perform the job anymore, to get another job, preferably through
a direct job to job transfer.
In the United States, the major problem of the
unemployment benefits system is the low level of income
replacement. The increased involvement of employers or unions
would probably not provide a better solution, unless the system
is modified to require considerably more contributions from
these actors. On the other hand, important progress has been
made with regard to the American unemployment compensation
system in states that have utilized a more active approach to
their job search requirements.
It is also hoped that the
increased use of technology will streamline some of the more
time-consuming bureaucratic processes in the system and permit
unemployed workers to access their benefits more quickly.
D. PROTECTION IN CASE OF SICKNESS
Because the United States lacks a federal paid sickness
leave policy under the current version of the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA), states and municipalities across the country
have had to fill in the gap by enacting their own paid sickness
and leave bills and ordinances. Needless to say, this lack of
uniformity in treatment with regard to sickness and other
related forms of leave has led to significant disparities in
treatment of sick employees across the country. Moreover,
because the FMLA currently only provides job-protected, unpaid
sick leave for twelve weeks per year only for employers with fifty
or more employees,402 there is a large number of workers at
smaller American employers who may be entitled to no sickness
benefits at all as a matter of law, and must depend instead on
the benevolence of their employer.

402.

See generally The Family and Medical Leave Act, supra note 110.
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The other way in which American employees may be eligible
for a “sickness” benefit is through Workers Compensation state
laws or through the reasonable accommodation provisions of the
American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).
Workers
compensation laws provide ex post compensation for those who
become sick or injured as a result of their employment.403 The
ADA, on the other hand, provides that qualified individuals with
a disability must receive reasonable accommodations to allow
them to continue to work, as long as it does not cause an undue
burden on the employer.404
Thus, the ADA and worker
compensation laws might provide additional protections for sick
or injured workers in the American Workplace.
Such concerns do not impact the Dutch sickness benefits
scheme, where all workers are entitled to compensation
according to a uniform, national Act. However, unlike other
schemes in Western Europe, this compensation is not paid on
the basis of a benefit scheme. Instead, Dutch employers are
required by statute to pay for 104 weeks (two years) of 70% of
the wages for their sick employees.405 In other countries, such
period, if any, is much shorter.406 Many Dutch employees
actually receive a higher compensation for some time (e.g., the
first fifty-two weeks) on the basis of their collective agreement or
individual contract of employment.407
To cover this sickness pay obligation, employers can
purchase private insurance to cover this risk and insurance
companies offer policies without any underwriting taking
place.408 Most of these sickness insurance policies provide for a

403. Lee Anne Neumann, Comment, Workers’ Compensation and High Stress
Occupations: Application of Wisconsin’s Unusual Stress Test to Law Enforcement
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 147, 162 (1993).
404. Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA.
L. REV. 1119, 1129–30 (2010).
405. Social Security Programs throughout the World: Europe, 2010 Netherlands,
SSA, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2010-2011/Europe/Netherlands
(last visited Apr. 4, 2015).
406. See, e.g., Statutory Sick Pay (SSP): Employer Guide, GOV.UK,
https://www.gov.uk/employers-sick-pay/eligibility-and-form-ssp1 (last visited Mar.
22, 2015).
407. EurWORK, Collective Bargaining Developments Marked by Stability,
EUROFOUND,
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/de/observatories/eurwork/articles/industrialrelations-working-conditions-other/collective-bargaining-developments-marked-bystability (last visited Apr. 4, 2015).
408. Philip R. de Jong, Recent Changes in Dutch Disability Policy, APE 1, 10,
(July 2012) http://www.ape.nl/include/downloadFile.asp?id=322.
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type of stop-loss insurance, meaning that the employer pays for
the first six weeks of sickness before the insurance coverage
becomes operable.409 The obligation to pay sick pay also applies
to those who are employed on a part-time basis;410 in addition
the Sickness Benefits Act provides for public benefits for the
unemployed and some other specified categories.
Finally,
through the Dutch Gatekeepers Act, employers must work to
reintegrate sick or injured employees back into the workforce,
much like the ADA requires in the United States, although the
Dutch obligations and fines in case of non-compliances are more
uniformly specified (e.g. extension of the sick pay period by a
maximum of twelve months).411 The combined effect of these
provisions are seen as improving both safety and health in the
Dutch workplace and the integration of ill and disabled persons
in society.
We will not go deep into the protection of women in case of
pregnancy and maternity, but the differences in this area are
significant.
Whereas the protection deemed necessary for
mother and child means that women receive 100% of their full
wage during four months in the Netherlands,412 such protection
is lacking in the United States. Also for self-employed women,
there is now a public benefit (at subsistence level).413 It is seen
as important that women take the rest to have the child and
that employers do not feel the costs of having employees who
become pregnant.
E. HEALTH CARE BENEFITS
It is interesting that for their healthcare systems, the
United States and the Netherlands have comparable dynamics.
This is especially so since most of the industrialized world
409. See id.
410. Zorgverzekeringswet, Stb. 2005, 358.
411. Wet Verlenging loondoorbetaling bij ziekte, Stb. 1996, 142 (Sickness Act).
412. Due to EU law, this protection applies generally to all EU states, though the
EU Parliament is currently attempting to lengthen the period of maternity leave. See
European Trade Union Committee for Education, Maternity Leave Directive Back in
European Parliament (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.csee-etuce.org/news/archive/273maternity-leave-directive-back-ineuropean-parliament (last visited Jan. 12, 2015)
(describing lengthening of EU minimum law from 14 to 20 weeks).
413. Simone Cusack, Decision to Deny Certain Self-Employed Women Maternity
Benefits Violated CEDAW (Elisabeth de Blok et al. v. the Netherlands), OPCEDAW
(Sept. 1, 2014), http://opcedaw.wordpress.com/2014/09/01/decision-to-deny-certainself-employed-women-maternity-benefits-violated-cedaw-elisabeth-de-blok-et-al-vthe-netherlands/.
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operates with single-payer, national health systems providing
most health care benefits.414 The Dutch Health Care Act now
obliges individuals to buy insurance from a private company.415
Likewise, under the ACA, Americans who do not have health
insurance through Medicare, Medicaid, their employer, or
through an individually-bought policy, are obliged under the
individual mandate to have “minimum essential coverage.”416
Such insurance policies can be bought on state exchanges, where
individuals live in states that have set up such exchanges, or on
the federal exchange, if the state has not developed a state
exchange.417 Additionally, under the ACA’s employer mandate,
employers with at least fifty full-time equivalent employees
must provide the opportunity for 95% of their full-time
employees to receive minimum essential coverage through an
employer-based health insurance policy.418 If the employer does
not provide such coverage or does not provide statutorilydetermined “affordable” coverage, the employer must pay a
penalty per employee which helps to finance the tax subsidies
lower-income Americans receive to purchase policies on a federal
or state health exchange.419
In both countries, there are requirements as far as what
health costs must be covered by the statutorily required scheme.
However, there is much room for individual choice between
companies, and within a company, there are some choices
between policies, whereas the statutorily required benefit
package can be extended by extra coverage only minimally.
That being said, American health plans vary considerably on
what benefits they offer depending on if they are insured or selfinsured, large plans or small plans, or grandfathered or nongrandfathered.420
Although there is a risk of substantial
414. See True Cost, List of Countries with Universal Healthcare, TRUE COST
BLOG (Aug. 9, 2009, 9:25 PM), http://www.truecostblog.com/2009/08/09/countrieswith-universal-healthcare-by-date.
415. Claire Daley & James Gubb, Healthcare Systems: The Netherlands, CIVITAS,
http://www.civitas.org.uk/nhs/download/netherlands.pdf (last updated Jan. 2013).
416. Annie L. Mach, Individual Mandate Under ACA, CONG. RES. SERV. 1 (Aug.
12, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41331.pdf.
417. See Richard Cauchi, State Actions to Address Health Insurance Exchanges,
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS. (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/stateactions-to-implement-the-health-benefit.aspx.
418. See Employer Mandate Fact Sheet, supra note 159, at 1.
419. Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4980H, 124 Stat. 235 (2013).
420. See Grandfathered v. Non-Grandfathered Plans Under ObamaCare, UPMC
(Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.yourhealthcaresimplified.org/news/grandfathered-vsnon-grandfathered-plans-under-obamacare/ (explaining the key differences between
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differences between the types of health insurance employees
receive with different employers, there is still more choice than
in government-run schemes like those found in most countries
with national health plans. This increased choice fits well
within the consumer-driven benefit plans of present-day
American society, whether 401(k) plans on the pension side or
high-deductible health plans coupled with health saving
accounts on the health side.421
In the Dutch system, the focus is more on the legislature’s
wish that insurance companies require more efficient health
care by making arrangements with the care providers. The
limits of such flexibility are, however, still subject to strict
political discussion and supervision by government and
parliament. In December 2014, for instance, a bill was discussed
in parliament to allow insurance companies to offer a policy that
obliges patients to go to specific care providers contracted by the
care provider, thus limiting their choice for a health care
provider.422 By such contracts, it is possible to have cheaper and
more efficient health care. In addition, more expensive policies
allowing free choice remain available. Parliament, however, did
not agree with this restriction on choice.423
V.

GENERAL DIFFERENCES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF
THE SYSTEMS

A. USE OF PRIVATE ACTORS
In the Netherlands, where private actors are statutorily
involved in the administration of benefits (like employers with
the various health plans in existence—with the main stipulation being that
grandfathered plans do not have to comply with all of the ACA changes, such as
cover preventive care with no cost sharing or guarantee a right to appeal denial
decisions).
421. See
High
Deductible
Health
Plan,
HUMANA,
https://www.humana.com/insurance-throughemployer/products-and-services/medicalplans/hdhp (last visited Oct. 11, 2014) (noting how using both a high deductible
health plan (HDHP) and health savings account (HSA) allows a person to set aside a
pre-planned amount of tax-free money (just like for a 401(k)) to cover health costs).
422. Kamerstukken 2014/15, 33.362, Wijziging van de Wet marktordening
gezondheidszorg en enkele andere wetten, teneinde te voorkomen dat zorgverzekeraars
zelf zorg verlenen of zorg laten aanbieden door
zorgaanbieders waarin zij zelf zeggenschap hebben.
423. Sam de Voogt, Senaat verwerpt plan beperking vrije zorgkeuze, PvdA-fractie
wil praten, NRC.NL, (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/12/16/plannieuwe-zorgpolis-niet-door-de-eerste-kamer.
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sick pay and private insurance companies with healthcare), their
responsibilities are regulated to a large extent. In the United
States, there is very little use of private actors in the social
protection benefits schemes defined by legislation; in those areas
where states and employers are presumed to organize
protection, requirements on the contents of the protection
(especially in the healthcare context) can vary significantly.424
The difference between the two countries can also be seen in
the legal protections offered to those receiving benefits, the level
of benefits offered, and the grounds for excluding individuals
from receiving benefits. For instance, with health care, the
Dutch system provides a minimum package of benefits in high
detail.425 The Dutch Health Care Act also gives detailed rules on
the role insurance companies play in the system.426
In the Netherlands, there is attachment to the idea that
giving the private actors a role in the social protection benefit
system
will encourage more efficient and effective
administration of the benefit rules and will encourage
individuals to go back to work. Such reforms will also invest
private actors, like employers, with an interest in reducing the
expense of the social protection system. But the government
also has an interest in keeping people employed. So the choice
for individuals, for a health care package, is not an independent
aim but is instrumental in giving insurance companies
incentives to work more efficiently.
In the United States, the ACA gives much space for
employers and insurance companies to design important
elements of how healthcare is delivered to employees. The
federal government provides the underlying scheme for health
benefits to be received by most Americans, but significant
latitude remains for insurance companies and employers to
operate within that system. Individual states have taken
different tactics regarding their involvement with the ACA
scheme. Some states have set up their own health insurance
marketplaces, while others have not. Also, some states have
accepted the Medicaid expansion contemplated by the ACA,
424. See The At-Will Presumption And Exceptions To The Rule, NAT’L CONF. OF
ST. LEGIS., http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employmentoverview.aspx (last visited Oct. 12, 2014) (intimating that employment is “presumed”
to be at-will everywhere in the United States except Montana, which is in stark
contrast to almost everywhere else in the world where employers can only fire people
for cause).
425. See infra Part III(e).
426. See id.
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while others have not. So there is significant variability as far
as the health care benefits offered to Americans in different
parts of the country. So whereas the minimum package of
health benefits is defined by the statute in the Netherlands,
statutory obligations to provide essential health benefits under
the ACA vary greatly based on the status of the plan
(grandfathered vs. non-grandfathered), size of the employer
(large or small), and the manner in which the health plan is
funded (self-funded or insured). Apart from all these differences,
health care does provide an important role for private actors in
both countries, especially beyond what minimum duties are
defined by statute.
The American system is not completely without rules for
how private actors like employers engage in the benefit system,
but such involvement is through more indirect means such as
through the reasonable accommodation provisions of the ADA or
application of unpaid sick leave through the FMLA. 427 These
indirect means include prohibitions on risk selection through
outlawing preexisting conditions exclusions,428 the possibility
that health insurance works retroactively for a person, the
definition of basic provisions of the package, controlled
contributions, and subsidies for lower income individuals for
healthcare insurance.So the private market has been heavily
regulated, but still there are incentives for the actors to take
their responsibilities seriously.
With regard to occupational pensions, employers and
employee organizations play a sizable role in both countries.
They have significant latitude in how to design their retirement
plan schemes. However, the Dutch authorities supervise the
funds more strictly in order to avoid employer bankruptcy or the
situation where funds can no longer meet promised obligations.
Dutch supervisory bodies even require funds to cut back on
benefits to right the pension ship. Although the United States
427. See Disability Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/disability.cfm (last visited Oct. 12, 2014) (outlining
the various protections U.S. workers have when it comes to work reinstatement
under the disability law); see also The Family and Medical Leave Act, supra note 110
(specifying that it is only in very rare circumstances that someone with taking leave
for medical reasons would be denied reinstatement by an employer under the
FMLA).
428. See The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), U.S.
DEP’T
OF
LABOR
(last
visited
Oct.
12,
2014),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fshipaa.html (curbing risk selection concerns by
severely limiting the possibilities of people being screened out for pre-existing
medical conditions).
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has pension insurance for defined benefit plans that become
financially distressed under the scheme set up by the federal
PBGC, there is no protection for private-sector defined
contribution plans (like 401(k) plans), nor for public employee
pension plans on the state level. As a result, there are
significant continuing problems with assuring adequate
retirement security for employees with these types of pension
plans. And even for those employees covered by the PBGC,
because so many plans became distressed during the global
recession, the PBGC is significantly underfunded given all of the
terminated single and multiemployer pension plans.
B. EXTENT OF OCCUPATIONALLY-BASED BENEFIT SYSTEMS
A second important difference between the Dutch and
American social protection benefit systems is the extent of the
two countries’ protection of workers through non-government
actors. Taking employer-based benefit systems into account, the
picture changes considerably. Although the Netherlands has an
important occupational-based benefit scheme for retirement
security, the relative significance of the voluntarily-adopted,
employer-sponsored schemes for all types of benefits (pensions
and welfare) in the United States is much larger. This is
because meaningful national sickness and health programs are
mostly lacking in the United States as described above. Sick
pay, retirement, health insurance, and disability are regulated
to a much larger extent in the Netherlands.
In the Netherlands, private actors (in particular the
employers’ and employees’ organizations) were removed from the
administration of the public schemes. Insofar as private actors
are involved, in particular the insurance companies in health
care and employers in sick pay, they have to bear the costs of the
decisions themselves; in that, the statutory acts specifically
define the rights and obligations of the covered persons and of
the private actors. By these rules, the legislature maintains its
constitutional responsibility for the basic protection in these
areas. For occupational pensions, there is more room for the
non-public actors to organize protection, but even here there is
public responsibility present as witnessed by the promotion of
development of these schemes, the protections against fund
deficits, and the influence on the contents of schemes by the
rules on tax deductions. Unlike the Netherlands, tax subsidies
are largely unconditional in the United States, so long as plan
qualification requirements are met.
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A voluntary occupational scheme necessarily entails
inequalities and exclusions of particular groups, gaps in
coverage, and prohibitively expensive coverage for some.429 We
see this phenomenon in both countries.430 In the Netherlands,
there are, however, mechanisms that exist for extending the
occupational system, as we have seen in the section on the
retirement pensions. For example, employers and employees
can ask the minister to extend a scheme for the whole sector,
thus including all employers. In the United States, similar
benefit mechanisms exist under the ACA for the provisions of
health care with regard to how the federal government
intervenes in shaping how employer-sponsored health insurance
schemes must operate.
C. IMPLICATIONS OF COUNTRY COMPARISONS
Taking all of these comparisons into account can enlarge the
domain of the discussion. What type of social protection benefits
should a country provide and to what extent should they be
organized and regulated by the federal government, state, or
non-governmental actor? Does the chosen approach provide for
sufficient coverage for most of the population? If not, should
existing social protection be supplemented by additional
employer-based or private schemes?
If such benefits are to be defined by legislation, how is it
best to ensure that dedicated funds are used adequately, and is
this possible to do by giving particular actors (e.g., private vs.
public actors or national vs. local actors) responsibility? To some
extent, this limits their freedom, but since some of the schemes
are subsidized by taxes, there may be justification for this
approach.
A final set of questions is that if social protection schemes
are to be increasingly organized by employers, what then is the
role of the various levels of government, especially if the
government subsidizes these provisions (e.g., by tax subsidies) or
requires certain minimal conditions by statute? Shouldn’t such
429. For instance, not everyone is covered. Some pension funds are more fullyfunded than others and have more generous pensions. Self-employed persons do not
have an employer who takes the employer’s share of the contributions; for them
pension plans are difficult to afford.
430. Thus some Dutch pension funds had to reduce the pensions, whereas others
did
not,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5b480ba4-0ee7-11e2-934300144feabdc0.html#axzz3J3JqFfIS (last visited 14 November 2014) (“454: Total
number of Dutch pension funds; 81: Number of Dutch funds likely to cut pensions.”).
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financial involvement mean that inequalities are diminished and
access guaranteed as a condition of receiving such subsidies as
opposed to promoting additional income inequality among
citizens?431 Shouldn’t federal and local laws be written to
require universal access and equal economic opportunity?
VI.

OF FEDERALISM AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES:
PRELIMINARY PROPOSALS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY SOCIAL PROTECTION
SYSTEMS

Although the United States introduced the term “social
security,” it did not really influence the meaning that this term
has since acquired in European countries. In the United States,
the term is limited to old age, survivors and disability benefits;
in the Dutch system it covers, like in other European countries,
many more risks; there is no strict definition of the term, but
usually commentators mention the list of risks covered by ILO
Convention 102.432
The different approach reflects the
responsibility various countries have taken upon their shoulders
for social protection benefits.
In the Netherlands, the
government has a constitutional responsibility for the welfare of
the population;433 in the United States, no such express
constitutional provision exists434 and such social protection is
considered more of a moral imperative than a legal one.
Of course, countries are free to design their own benefit
systems how they see fit and, moreover, systems have to fit into
the particular country’s culture, so copying foreign systems is
often not possible or recommended. However, based on the
foregoing analysis, we can propose a non-ideological discussion
431. See
Qualified
Retirement
Plans,
RAYMOND
JAMES,
http://www.raymondjames.com/personal_investing/solutions_small_business_qualifie
d_retirement_plans.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2014) (analyzing a variety of plan
choices and how easy it is for highly compensated employees to skirt the system and
favor themselves—using the SIMPLE IRA example because it is not subject to nondiscrimination tests or top-heavy rules, which allows highly compensated people
unfettered ability to defer as much as they want).
432. The ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention 1952 (No. 102),
ILO
(Aug.
12,
2012),http://www.ilo.org/secsoc/areasofwork/legaladvice/WCMS_205340/langen/index.
htm.
433. Art. 20 Gw.
434. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (refusing to apply notion
of welfare benefits as a form of constitutional property right to Social Security
disability insurance benefits).
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by the relevant policymakers and academics over whether social
protection schemes provided to the American and Dutch
populations are objectively sufficient.
The term “sufficient” is, of course, a difficult one. However,
the Committee of Social Rights, supervising the European Social
Charter, has developed a definition that may be very useful for
this purpose. According to this Committee, a subsistence income
should, in principle, amount to at least 50% of the country’s net
median equalized household income per adult.435 Of course, the
United States is not bound by the European Social Charter, but
because there is no other general basic global minimum
standard, it is very useful to take this standard as our departure
point.
It should not be surprising to any knowledgeable observer
that the United States system does not guarantee this minimal
subsistence income. After all, for those benefits where there is
federal protection—old age, survivors, disability, and healthcare
for some—there are significant gaps in the persons protected
and the level of benefit is generally low. For instance, consider
that American Social Security only provides less than 50%
replacement income and people who live on Social Security alone
for retirement income are generally living at or near the poverty
level.436 For disability benefits under Social Security, sickness
benefits, and unemployment compensation, it is even much
clearer that a comprehensive protection is lacking for most
American citizens and that the recommended benefits protection
is not nearly reached.
In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the general benefit
rate is—unless in case of partial disability—70% of the previous
wage.437 For those having a wage at or slightly above the
minimum wage state subsistence, benefits provide for a
guaranteed subsistence income. This is around $20,000 a year,
whereas the median income is $41,490.438
435. EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF SOCIAL RIGHTS, EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER:
CONCLUSIONS XVII-1, 177 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2004). The
Committee used this definition in its assessment of country schemes without
publishing underlying papers discussing how the standard was developed.
436. See Stephen Gross et al, Actuarial Note Number 155, Replacement Rates for
Retirees: What Makes Sense for Planning and Evaluation?, SSA, 3-5 (July 2014),
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/.../note 155.pdf; see also Economic Security for
Seniors: Fact Sheet, NCOA (Feb. 19, 2015, 3:30PM), http://www.ncoa.org/pressroom/fact-sheets/economic-security-for.
437. Art. 59 WIA (The New Disability Act).
438. Hoe
Hoog
is
het
minimumloon?,
RIJKSOVERHEID

PENNINGS (DO NOT DELETE)

10/1/15 10:30 AM

2015]ADMINISTRATION OF SOCIAL PROTECTION BENEFITS 389

The preceding analysis shows that within the United
States, a discussion must be started as to whether the present
social protection scheme is satisfactory for most Americans. At
the very least, we can conclude based on this analysis that
additional social protection benefits in the United States would
alleviate the financial uncertainty that many retired, sick, and
unemployed Americans face on a daily basis.
The question of a sufficiently high benefit should not focus
only at the subsistence level, but also on whether it is an
adequate replacement of lost income. After all, risks may
materialize at any moment and for any person. Isn’t it,
therefore, a more modern and humane approach that persons
are given, in cases of such uncertainty, benefit compensation
through which they can maintain their standard of living and
find a way to adjust to their new situation? For this purpose, a
certain income replacement ratio is desirable. Of course, this
idea has already been generally accepted in the United States,
but mainly to the extent that employers voluntarily make such
arrangements based on their own perceived self-interest and
perhaps in a manner that is beyond their core competencies. It
seems unacceptable to us that an individual’s fate depends so
much on the choice of his or her employer when that employer
does not have a fiduciary duty to do what is the best interest of
the employee in most situations. We believe strongly that there
should be a general, public interest in ensuring a minimum level
of benefit replacement ratio for uncertain times in a person’s life.
We base this conclusion on the fundamental human rights
notion that all individuals have equal worth and dignity, and the
government respects individual dignity by making sufficient
provision for their well-being in vulnerable times.
The necessary social protection benefit standards have
already been developed by the International Labour
Organization and the Council of Europe. These vary, according
to the instrument used, and there is some variation in the
instrument. The lowest post Second World War standards can
be found in ILO Convention 102, and these start from 40% of the
previous income, depending on the benefit concerned. Note that
these standards have been raised in later instruments and have
a global meaning. Developing countries should also be able to
ratify this instrument.
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/minimumloon/vraag-en-antwoord/hoe-hoogis-het-minimumloon.html (last visited May 31, 2015).
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Taking as a standard that 50% of the average individual
income has to be compensated through social protection benefits
is a reasonable starting point.439 After all, this proposed
standard still means an important reduction for the income of
most individuals.
In the American system, such income
replacement by benefit schemes is currently not guaranteed,
though Social Security provides such benefits for most citizens.
However, for sickness, disability, and unemployment benefits,
such guarantee is lacking in the United States and must be
addressed.
For its part, the Netherlands has a problem with reaching
this level of income replacement for the partially disabled, since
the Act’s approach in which persons are activated to go back to
work has led to levels of benefit that do not meet these
standards. As we have seen in Section III.B, the claimant who,
upon expiration of his wage-related benefit, does not satisfy the
condition that she earns at least 50% of the person’s remaining
earning capacity is eligible for a low benefit. In the case of full
disability, this is 70% of the statutory minimum wage.440 In
cases of partial disability, the level depends on the incapacity
rate.441 Persons who are incapacitated to a level of less than
35% are not eligible for a benefit.442
In both countries, we see that levels below the national
government (i.e., regional authorities, state or local level
governments, employers, or insurance companies) are granted
responsibility to arrange social protection. In the United States,
this dynamic has been in place for many years, and especially
since the enactment of ERISA in 1974, which provides tax
incentives for the voluntary creation of employer-sponsored
pension and welfare benefit plans. Moreover, in the area of
healthcare, new obligations introduced under the ACA have
placed additional regulatory burdens on states, employers, and
insurance companies.
In the Netherlands, the shift of responsibilities to actors
others than public authorities is a more recent development.443
439. See European Committee of Social Rights, European Social Charter:
Conclusions
2004,
Vol.
1
at
107
(July
2004),
available
at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/conclusions/Year/2004Vol1_en.pdf
(discussing poverty threshold).
440. Art. 62 WIA (The New Disability Act).
441. Id.
442. Art. 61(6) WIA (The New Disability Act).
443. Although in the past they were involved in the benefit administration, so it
is not so new development. However, having the full responsibility by bearing the
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Indeed, important and interesting differences exist between the
American and Dutch approaches. There appears to be more
distrust in the Netherlands in providing subsidies/benefits to
lower level public authorities or organizations, as it is feared
that funds are spent not as efficiently as possible if the
organization that makes the decisions does not bear the expense
for these. Instead, there is indeed a tendency to decentralize
benefit administration since lower level bodies, whether
employers or insurance companies, know better the local
conditions and problems of their specific part of the country.
Under this approach, these actors have to bear the costs
themselves (local governments receive a lump sum for their
tasks) and can keep the money they gain by employing efficient
measures. However, the national legislation defines the basic
principles and the framework for such benefit spending, and
thus ensures that the claims of beneficiaries are dealt with
according to the national legislation.
When the law gives employers responsibilities for
compensation, as is the case with sick pay in the Netherlands,
the law defines the obligations in a general sense and makes
such benefits compulsory for all employers. So the role of the
employers and sickness insurance companies is to take over
public tasks in the way the government wants. In addition to
this, they can still provide voluntary benefits.
In sum, in both the United States and the Netherlands,
regional authorities (the states and municipalities), employers,
and insurance companies are given a responsibility that
traditionally has been a public one. To ensure consistency and
uniformity of benefit provisions through both countries, it is
critical that legislation provides for the basic rules and
principles in order to realize a minimum income, a decent
income replacement, and adequate health, disability, and
sickness benefits.
It makes good sense to give regional authorities, employers,
and insurance companies the task of benefit provision, as they
are closer to the persons concerned, and can better adjust
conditions, benefits, and supervision of such benefits to have the
maximum impact.
Insofar as there is concern regarding
ensuring minimum benefit standards, however, statutory
federal/national provisions are necessary to ensure equal
treatment, access, uniform coverage, and sufficient level of

costs of benefits is a new development.
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benefits for all individuals.
We now recommend that future discussions regarding the
responsibilities for, and the contents of, social protection benefit
systems take place in the light of the division of tasks between
the federal/national state and others (local government, private
companies, and employers). We recommend first that national
legislation define the minimum protection to be guaranteed to
all and that the federal/national level undertakes the burden of
enforcing these protections. Above, we mentioned subsistence
for all at the level of 50% of the median wage and, as a second,
higher ambition, 50% of the individual’s last, previous wage.
Both are minimum benefits only and, of course, more generous
benefits can always be contemplated.
Secondly, it is relevant to decide which public or private
actors should arrange this minimum provision of benefits. The
minimal benefit level should be regulated at the national/federal
level and applicable for all workers (and residents, in any case
where health care is concerned). However, applying principles of
federalism or subsidiarity,444 implementation should be done by
those most in touch with the persons being covered. That means
that we suggest that benefit implementation, depending on the
type of benefit, be done at the regional and local level by regional
authorities, municipalities, employers, and insurance companies.
So this may mean that more benefit-related statutory duties
become applicable to private actors in the United States, where
they have to realize the minimum protection deemed necessary
by the federal government.
Apart from the behavior of non-public actors, benefit
schemes must be better regulated in order to protect the
interests of the insured. For this purpose, we propose that a
fiduciary duty be applied to benefit administrators’ conduct.445
Employers and insurance companies tend to be self-interested
and conflicted when providing benefits.446 For this reason, we
recommend that national legislation be passed in both countries
that requires employers and insurance companies that provide
benefits to workers and individuals to follow fiduciary standards
444. For the Netherlands, the term “federalism” is less appropriate; however, the
concept is still very applicable.
445. This fiduciary standard is borrowed from ERISA law. See 29 U.S.C. 1104
(2012) (setting out fiduciary standards of loyalty and care for ERISA fiduciaries).
446. The U.S. Supreme Court has discussed these structural conflicts of interest
in denial of benefit cases. See Metropolitan Life v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2348
(2008) (noting the inherently conflicted nature of an employer fiduciary who both
decides benefit claims and pays for granted benefit claims).
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of loyalty and care. Such a system is already in place with
regard to ERISA plans in the United States, and so we seek the
expansion of such fiduciary duties to the provision of all social
protection benefits to all persons. This approach recognizes the
dignity and worth of all individuals, especially during times of
uncertainty, and will lead to important protections against
abuse, discrimination, and insolvency. The concept of fiduciary
standard does not replace current law, but supplements these
standards. This is appropriate, as even when statutory rules
and concepts apply, the self-interest of organizations or
employers can conflict with individual interests. As we have
seen, eliminating self-interest is explicitly desired by the Dutch
legislature, but overall criteria are still missing. The concept of
fiduciary standards may be very useful to improve Dutch social
protection law in this regard.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this article has been to introduce a new
approach to social protection benefit provision through an
analysis and comparison of two of the advanced benefit systems
in the world. Both the Dutch and American examples teach us
that meaningful social benefit protection is possible, consistent,
and necessary within market-based societies.
Our recommendation is that advanced-market societies
start a discussion on social protection benefits based on the dual
principles of subsidiarity and fiduciary duty.
Subsidiarity
provides that the national/federal government should provide
the principles and minimal framework for benefit provision,
while regional authorities, employers, and insurance companies
should be given freedom, and the duty, to implement the
underlying schemes to meet the challenges of the local situation.
However, to constrain the sometime self-interested and
conflicted motives of employers and insurance companies in the
benefits system, we also suggest that countries adopt, at the
national level, fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to protect
against abuse, discrimination, and arbitrary action in the
provision of such benefits. In addition, these principles should
also be applied to employer-sponsored schemes in both countries,
to the extent that such duties do not already exist.
We hope, and believe, that through the construction of such
a social benefit system, countries can guarantee a minimal level
of benefit protection that will help their citizens negotiate
difficult times during retirement, disability, sickness, injury, and
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unemployment. In turn, the “benefit” of such a system will be
the recognition of the dignity and self-worth of all individuals,
which is a non-ideological goal that we can all embrace.

